

Summary of Developments
in Major Problems of
United States Foreign Policy

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The general outline of the Summary is keyed to the outline in Part III of "Major Problems of the United States Foreign Policy, 1947—A Study Guide." Variations in this outline may occur from time to time with changes in the course of current history and the resultant shifts in the problems confronting the United States. Any major variations of this kind will be noted in the Introduction to each issue of the Summary.

The material in this Summary is based on publicly available official documents bearing on the events recorded and on information contained in selected American and foreign newspapers. Every effort is made to verify the accuracy of the statements made.

This publication is a part of a broad program of research and education in international relations, recently inaugurated by the Brookings Institution and focused on the current foreign policies of the United States. The program is being undertaken by the staff of the Institution's International Studies Group. The Summary is prepared by Jeannette E. Muther assisted by Constance G. Coblenz, Marie J. Thresher, Frances M. Shattuck, Tatiana Buzanova, and Maxine Lybarger, under the guidance of the principal members of the research staff.

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OUTSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MONTH

Four critical situations formed the focal points of developments during April affecting the major problems of United States foreign policy. They arose from friction among the occupation authorities in Berlin; the outbreak of violence in Bogotá, Colombia, that almost caused the termination of the Ninth International Conference of American States; the national elections in Italy; and the increasing violence in Palestine with the approach of May 15, the date of termination of the British mandate.

The Western Powers suspended passage of military trains into Berlin on April 1 following the issuance of new traffic control regulations by the Soviet occupation authorities late in March. An exchange of notes between the Soviet authorities on the one hand and the British, American, and French on the other revealed that the Soviet Union did not interpret the arrangement of June 29, 1945 as permitting free and unrestricted use of the corridors established for the Western Powers' communications with the city. Communications were maintained with Berlin by airplane and tension mounted to a new peak after a mid-air crash on April 5 between a Soviet fighter plane and a British passenger plane bound for Berlin. These moves were widely interpreted as an effort by the Soviet Union to drive the British, American, and French occupation authorities out of Berlin, but the latter steadily maintained that they would not evacuate the city.

The Ninth International Conference of American States which had convened at Bogotá, Colombia, on March 30, was violently interrupted on April 9, when the assassination of Gaitán, a Liberal party leader, touched off a wave of rioting and revolution. Order was not restored for several days and there were doubts for a time that the Conference would continue. It resumed its sessions, however, on April 14 and completed its work by the end of the month. Among the more important accomplishments of the Conference were: (1) the drafting of a treaty-charter of the Organization of American States which gives organic status to the 58-year old Pan American Union as a regional organization under the United Nations Charter; (2) the Pact of Bogotá, which prescribed obligations and procedures of pacific settlement for the twenty-one American states; (3) a pact for basic economic co-operation in the Americas; (4) a resolution on American colonies, which looks toward an end to colonialism in the Western Hemisphere and to the occupation of American territories by extra-continental countries; and (5) an anti-Communist declaration which condemns "in the name of the law of nations, interference of any foreign power, or any political organization serving the interests of a foreign power, in the public life of the nations of the American continent."

The first two weeks of the month were also marked by several moves designed to influence the outcome of the Italian national elections. The United States, Great Britain, and France on April 9 again suggested to the Soviet Union a meeting for the purpose of considering the return of Trieste to Italy. The Soviet reply of April 13 rejected the procedure outlined as unacceptable. Meanwhile, the question of Italian membership in the United Nations had again been raised and resulted in a Security Council veto on April 10 by the Soviet Union. The elections, when finally held on April 18 and 19, resulted in a victory for the Christian Democrats who received more

than 48 per cent of the popular votes in contrast to the Popular Front (with a majority of Communists) which received slightly more than 30 per cent. These results gave the de Gasperi government a comfortable margin in both houses of the national legislature.

Fighting between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine became more violent during April, with constant military action along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road in order to maintain the Jewish lines of communication into the latter city. On April 1, the Security Council had agreed to ask both Jews and Arabs to attempt a truce and had called a special session of the General Assembly for April 16 to consider the Palestine question. Attempts to effect a truce at United Nations headquarters were unsuccessful, and on April 17 the Security Council passed a resolution calling on all persons and organizations in Palestine to cease activities of a military nature. A week later the Council also established a Truce Commission in Palestine comprised of consular representatives of Belgium, France, and the United States. The Soviet Union abstained, however, in the Council voting on all these actions.

Four days after the special session of the General Assembly was convened on April 16, the United States formally put forward its proposal for a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, with the Trusteeship Council to be designated as administering authority. Within a week, the Soviet Union, which had previously boycotted the Trusteeship Council, announced its intention of providing a representative on it, and when the Council convened on April 27 to attempt to obtain a truce in Jerusalem, the Soviet representative was present for the first time. As the month ended, it was reported that military leaders of Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt had agreed on a plan of military campaign against Palestine after May 15.

These four situations overshadowed other developments directed toward the integration of Western Europe. On April 2, Congress finally approved authorizing legislation for the European Recovery Program, and President Truman signed the bill on the following day. A week later the first purchases under the program were authorized. On April 16, sixteen Western European nations, including representatives of the western zones in Germany, signed an agreement in Paris establishing a permanent organization for economic co-operation. The next day, the five nations signatory to the Brussels Treaty for a Western European Union created a permanent consultative council which first met in London on April 24. At the end of the month, Secretary of State Marshall was reported to have said that among the questions under discussion in the Department of State, in connection with any United States support to a Western European Union, was the extension of some form of lend-lease to the five nations now signatory to the Brussels Treaty.

Following up his message of March 17 in which he requested the enactment of universal training and selective service legislation, President Truman on April 1 requested an additional \$3 billion for national defense for the fiscal year 1949. These two recommendations of the President became closely linked in Congressional consideration of the entire defense program during the month. Hearings were held by both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on these proposals and a point of difference soon developed over the increases to be made in the air forces. On April 15, the House of Representatives voted to increase them from 55 to 70 groups, contrary to the Administration's recommendations.

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I. PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENTS

A. PEACE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

1. Germany

Friction Between Occupation Authorities

On April 1, the Western Powers suspended the passage of military trains between their zones and Berlin. This action followed the institution by the Soviet Military Government--at the end of March and on only 24 hours' notice--of new traffic control regulations, to which the other occupation authorities refused to adhere. The British and Americans began flying food into the city, and the French were understood to be planning similar action.

U. S. Army Secretary Royall announced on the 2nd that agreement had been reached with Gen. Clay to "hold our position" but not to be "provocative." He read a communication from the General stating that "in spite of some imaginary reports, our people are calm and continue their everyday life normally. Evacuation is to me unthinkable." In France, it was formally stated that "the French Government would not and could not consider the withdrawal of the French command or of the French troops stationed in Berlin."

The Soviet authorities sent a warning to the United States and British Military Governments on April 3 informing them that during the next few days an unusually large number of combat planes would be flying in the vicinity of their air route and advising them to take appropriate precautions.

The next day (4th) brought to a conclusion an issue which had developed at the end of March when Soviet authorities sent armed guards into the main railroad building in Berlin--the control center for trains in the Soviet zone. As this building was in the American sector of the city, the United States military authorities promptly established their own guard around the building, refusing to allow any more Soviet nationals to enter until their (Soviet) soldiers had left. Following a demand by the U. S. deputy commander to the Soviet deputy commander for an explanation of the action, the Soviet guards were withdrawn.

United States authorities made public on April 4 the text of a note sent on March 31 by the American chief of staff in Germany to the Soviet deputy commander protesting against Soviet insistence on inspection of Allied military trains. The United States also published the Soviet reply, together with a further American note sent in response to the Soviet communication. In his note of March 31, the American chief of staff said: "The agreement under which we entered Berlin clearly provided for our free and unrestricted utilization of the established corridors. ... I do not consider that the provisions you now propose are consistent with the agreement. I must also advise you that we do not propose to accept changes in this agreement." He stated, however, that although he could not allow

Soviet representatives to board American military trains for purposes of inspection, he was prepared to furnish the Soviet authorities with passenger lists and copies of the orders of each passenger in the case of passenger trains and with cargo manifests for freight trains. He offered to discuss such procedures with the Soviet authorities, "although not on 24 hours' notice."

In his reply, the Soviet deputy commander said:

"I cannot help considering as a misunderstanding and an error the statement set forth in your letter as though there were some sort of agreement concerning the 'free and unrestricted use of the established corridors' connecting Berlin with the western zones of occupation in Germany. There was not, and there cannot be, any agreement concerning the orderless and uncontrolled traffic of freight and personnel through the territory of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany."

In conclusion, the Soviet deputy commander stated that he could see no possibility of changing the existing regulations but was "quite prepared to clarify ... certain details concerning the movements of strictly military freight and personnel of the American Military Government for the purpose of removing difficulties not connected with the aforementioned problems."

To this communication, the U. S. chief of staff replied in part:

"American representatives who were present at the meeting in Berlin on 29 June 1945, with Marshal Zhukov, clearly understood that the United States forces in Berlin would have free and unrestricted use of the established corridors to meet their requirements, subject only to normal regulation of movements. The withdrawal from those parts of the eastern zone then occupied by United States forces was undertaken concurrently with the move of the United States forces into Berlin in this understanding."

He repeated his offer to enter into discussions to "determine if mutually satisfactory procedures [could] be effected" but emphasized that "a discussion predicated upon our acceptance of your entry into our military trains while in transit from your zones could lead to no results." A similar exchange of communications took place between the British deputy military governor and the Soviet deputy commander.

The crash of a Soviet fighter plane with a British passenger plane on April 5, in which all occupants of both planes were killed, caused further tension between the occupying powers. The British plane had been flying to Berlin and, according to the British, was within the safety zone of the British airfield when the collision occurred.

The British military governor immediately registered a protest with the Soviet commander, asking him to condemn orders permitting the flight of the plane without prior notification and in a manner to cause disaster, and requesting an inquiry into the incident. He demanded written

assurances that there was no intention to interfere with the British air service and warned that if such a guarantee were not given, all British planes would be provided with fighter escorts. The U. S. military governor said that American planes would be similarly protected unless the British received satisfactory assurances.

The British Foreign Office announced that "a very serious view is taken in London of today's air crash in Berlin." However, the strain was somewhat relaxed the next day (6th) when the Soviet military administration issued a communiqué declaring that it "deeply regretted the unfortunate collision" and that the necessary assurances had been given by the Soviet commander. In a statement to the House of Commons on the 7th, Bevin said: "I wish to make it clear, pending the results of the inquiry, that I have no information to suggest that the conduct of the Soviet aircraft was in any way the result of direct instructions from the Soviet authorities."

The British Foreign Secretary, speaking of the departure of the Soviet commander from the Council meeting of March 20, told the House that "the British representatives, in consultation with their United States and French colleagues, are doing their best to negotiate with the Soviet authorities for a resumption of the normal activities of all the four-Power bodies."

Regarding the new Soviet travel regulations, Bevin pointed out that although the Western Powers considered that they had a clearly understood right to freedom of travel to and from Berlin, there was no definite written agreement to this effect. He declared, however, that "in view of the arrangements for the occupation of Berlin, we cannot yield our right of free access to and from these sectors of occupation--which is essential to maintain our forces and fulfill our obligations as an occupying Power." The Foreign Minister assured the House that the British Government would welcome an agreement, and expressed his conviction that "if there is good will the difficulties are capable of solution."

A reversal in attitude was evidenced by the Soviet commander in a letter addressed to the British military governor on the 6th. He denied Soviet responsibility for the plane catastrophe and refused a British proposal for the establishment of a joint commission of inquiry to which the Americans and French should each be invited to send a representative. He proposed instead that the inquiry should be conducted by a commission composed of Soviet and British members only. No mention was made of the assurances for which the British had asked. This letter was made public on the 8th by the Soviet authorities. At the same time, an article was published in the official Soviet press, charging that responsibility rested with the British plane for having failed to give notice of its presence over the Soviet airfield.

In a reply delivered to the Soviet commander on April 9, the British military governor observed that "the information so far at my disposal is at variance with the statement of the circumstances made in your letter." He accepted the suggestion for a Soviet-British Commission, proposing that the representatives should report separately to the respective commanders if they were unable to reach agreement. In conclusion, the military governor gave an assurance that "all British aircraft flying in the

Berlin area and in the corridors to the western zone of Germany have instructions to observe strictly the flight safety regulations of the Allied Control Authority." He took no cognizance in his letter of the Soviet failure to give the written guarantees that had been demanded.

The Soviet Military Government's reply to this note was received the next day (10th). It expressed satisfaction at acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a two-power investigation but alleged "perplexity" over the British suggestion that separate reports should be submitted in the event of disagreement, declaring that "the circumstances of the catastrophe are so obvious and the actual evidence in such cases carries so much weight that there cannot be any grounds for arriving at such conclusions. The submission of separate reports could take place only if the experts had been previously briefed in the spirit of an unobjective investigation."

On the same day, it was announced that the Soviet authorities had several days earlier declared their intention not to renew the passes of British and American personnel responsible for the maintenance of telephone and cable services with the German capital, stating that such services could be supplied by the Soviet-controlled "Deutsche Post." The United States and Great Britain asked for reconsideration of this move. They decided, however, not to contest a Soviet demand, made public on the 11th, that they should close down their aid stations on the western highway to Berlin, since the agreement on this matter applied only to the winter months.

The Anglo-Soviet inquiry into the airplane crash broke down at its third meeting (the 13th) as a result of Soviet insistence on the exclusion of all but Soviet and British witnesses. The British then announced their intention of making their own investigation and invited Soviet representatives to attend the hearings. Their inquiry was concluded on the 16th and the conclusions reached were made public in a British White Paper on the 19th.

The report found that "there was no evidence to show that the collision was anything but an accident" but laid the blame on the Soviet fighter, which was flying "in disregard of accepted rules ... and in particular of the quadripartite flying rules to which the Soviet authorities were parties." In announcing the findings of the British court of inquiry, Foreign Secretary Bevin told the House of Commons that the government would request compensation from the Soviet Union.

A Soviet commission, whose verdict was made public two days later (21st), found that "the reason for the collision was the British plane's violation of rules of flight and its piercing through the clouds." The British were accused of having tampered with the evidence, and the Soviet press stated that compensation for the loss of the Soviet plane would be demanded. The commission recommended that in future advance notice should be given of all intended flights over the Soviet zone, including a description of the plane and the names of passengers. It also proposed the prohibition of all night flying not visible from the ground.

Meanwhile, Soviet authorities had taken another step to impede communication between the western zones and Berlin. In violation of an

agreement concluded between the British and Soviet authorities in June 1946, they began on April 20 to hold up traffic on the inland waterways, stating that the documents then in use were no longer valid and must be replaced. On the 22nd, the Soviet authorities announced that they were discontinuing the train service which connected Berlin with the Nord Express in the British zone—cutting off the last international passenger train service out of Berlin for Allied personnel.

General Clay said two days later that, irrespective of any new Soviet regulations, the United States would "abide by the quadripartite agreement" and would "continue to use the air corridor." He added that no action was being taken "at the moment" to obtain the resumption of train services.

Düsseldorf Address by British Military Governor

Speaking on April 7 before the German North Rhine-Westphalian Parliament in Düsseldorf, in the presence of leading German political figures who had been invited to attend, British Military Governor General Robertson urged western Germans to accept for the time being the division of their country and to work together for the recovery of that part which remained free. He said:

"The primary objective of the bizonal administration in Frankfurt is to restore the economy of western Germany so it can play its full part in European recovery and bring back prosperity, but its ultimate object is to lay a foundation on which German unity can be restored. By unity, I mean real unity, with an independent, freely-elected government. ...

"That must be the goal of the future, but for the time being we must accept the fact that the iron curtain splits Germany. For the time being we must be content with unity as far as it can be achieved and not forget that this means the unity of two-thirds of Germany. The complete unity of Germany is only possible when the real will of all the people can be freely expressed. That day will come, but not yet."

General Robertson assured the Germans that the international council contemplated for control of the Ruhr was "intended to be constructive and not punitive." He pointed out that events were moving "in the general direction of integration of industry throughout Western Europe," that each country participating in the recovery program would have to make its contribution to the common pool, and that the proposed control of the Ruhr was "consonant with its [the recovery program's] great design and with the participation of Germany in it." The military governor also gave assurances that the British Government would not allow German industry to be returned to its former owners. In conclusion, the General said:

"Germany's salvation is in your hands to win or cast away. Only have the courage and you will win it. Come forward determined to make the best of the largest part of your country which is on the right side of the iron curtain. The rest will come in time. ..."

Following General Robertson's address, responsible German officials for the first time publicly voiced their willingness to accept a temporary division of Germany. Dr. Hans Ehard, Minister-President of Bavaria, declared on the 9th that "the withdrawal of United States, British, and French forces would mean that the Russians would come. And we do not want unity at that price." Since it appeared impossible to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union, he concluded that "we have to try to do something with the West," and he expressed the view that "the simplest way would be to form something like a 'Bundesregierung' [government of union]--which would be only temporary, nothing final."

Dr. Koehler, president of the Bizonal Economic Council, described Robertson's remarks as "realistic" and endorsed the view that German unity must begin with the unification of western Germany. Together with other Frankfort officials, however, he was said to have emphasized that the initiative in establishing a western German Government would have to be taken by the occupation authorities.

The Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia stated that he was not opposed to the suggested internationalization of the Ruhr if the security demands of France and the Benelux group were thereby met, but he urged that all industrial centers of Europe should be placed under similar control.

At a meeting with General Clay, U. S. Military Governor, on April 15, Dr. Puender, chief executive of the Bizonal Economic Administration, urged the promulgation of an occupation statute as a basis for the formation of a western German Government. Clay replied, however, that decisions on this question would have to await the forthcoming three-power conference in London.

Allied Control Council

General Clay, U. S. military governor, who, as chairman of the Allied Control Council for April was responsible for calling meetings, announced on April 9 that, as none of the four powers had requested that the meeting scheduled for the following day should take place, the Council would not be convened.

All-German People's Government

The Soviet-controlled Berlin radio announced on April 6 that a plebiscite would be held in the Soviet zone between May 13-23 to determine the wishes of the people on the question of German unity. On April 11, Otto Grotewohl, co-chairman of the communist-dominated Socialist Unity party, in an article appearing in the Soviet-licensed press, stated that the "next step" would be "the creation of a draft constitution for the united democratic German republic" and that lists for a plebiscite on the question of German unity would be ready "in a few weeks."

On the 17th, the U. S. Military Government announced that a request from the "People's Council of the People's Congress" for permission to conduct a plebiscite in the American zone had been refused. The statement pointed out that "the People's Council is a political organization

representing a very small percentage of the German people and which has never been approved by the Allied Control Authority." It declared further that everyone recognized "the earnest desire of all Germans for the restoration of German unity" and that no plebiscite was required.

Expulsion of Hungarian Missions from United States Zone

General Clay, with the full authorization of the Department of State, ordered the expulsion of the Hungarian repatriation and restitution missions from the American zone of Germany on April 15. This action followed Hungary's failure to answer satisfactorily protests made by the U. S. Military Government against interference with an American repatriation train in January. The military authorities charged that Hungarian police had prevented United States officials from carrying out their tasks and that they had taken no steps to prevent the looting of the train by Soviet troops while it was standing in a Hungarian station. It was said on the 20th that Hungary had protested to the United States Government against the expulsion of the Hungarian missions, asserting that this action violated the terms of the Hungarian peace treaty.

Protocol "M"

British Minister of State Hector McNeil, speaking in the House of Commons on April 19, announced that Protocol "M" (an allegedly Cominform document, containing detailed instructions for the disruption of the economy of western Germany), which the British believed authentic at the time of its publication (January 14), may in fact have been a forgery. Nevertheless, he pointed out: "There have been developments in Germany which correspond to statements included in the document, and there are strong indications that even if the document is not itself authentic, it has been compiled from authoritative communist sources, and this is corroborated by information already in our possession."

Production of Aluminum

The U. S. military authorities announced on April 20 that production of aluminum had begun in the Anglo-American zone of occupation. Its manufacture had been prohibited as a war material by the Allied Control Council in 1945, but this ban was recently lifted by the U. S.-British Military Government as a temporary measure to assist in improving the German economic position. General Clay pointed out that only wartime stocks of bauxite would be used and that the action "does not prejudice the decision that aluminum remains a prohibited industry for the future."

Resumption of Three-Power Talks

In line with action taken during March by the United States and Great Britain in repudiating a Soviet protest against the three-power talks on Germany recently held in London, the French Government rejected a similar Soviet communication in a note delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Paris on April 6. It was pointed out that as a result of the Soviet attitude in the Berlin Control Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers, these bodies had been unable to take decisions, so that there were in all

the zones of occupation urgent questions to be settled. The talks in London had been held with this end in view. The French also rejected as "inexact" and "tendentious" a Soviet charge that France was conforming to plans of American warmongers, and concluded that "the facts reply for themselves to the impudent assertions which try to distort that position."

A statement made by French Premier Schuman on the 11th indicated France's willingness to attempt to meet British and American views when the three powers resumed their talks on Germany in London on the 21st. The Premier explained that:

"With regard to Germany, we should make a distinction between immediate and long-term solutions. In seeking a new organization for Germany we should consider the existence of the German states that have an ethnic and geographical character quite aside from that unity that becomes dangerous and tends to engender totalitarian regimes. In this connection we must maintain our rights for our presence in Berlin for our security and reparations. But if a four-power accord becomes impossible we shall make a three-power agreement. Though we have no taste for antagonistic blocs, we feel some solution is necessary. It should be as least bad as possible but nevertheless a solution."

The French were, however, still determined to fight against a highly centralized government for Germany, as was made clear in the instructions given by the cabinet to the French delegation on April 15, and in a further statement made by Schuman on the 18th. On this occasion, he said: "There must be a statute for Germany founded on the principles of democracy. But the choice of this statute demands serious precautions. A plan that would establish and authorize a centralized power would mean for Germany a temptation, and for us a permanent threat of revenge and of warlike imperialism."

Meanwhile trizonal discussions on the technical plane which had been taking place in Berlin were making little progress, and a "high United States official" was said to have declared on the 17th that the issues could only be resolved by means of decisions at the London conference. One advance was noted at this time, however, in the disclosure that the banks of the French zone had joined the central bank of the Bizonal Economic Administration.

The conference on Germany between the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, adjourned since March 6, reopened in London on April 21 to consider the following agenda: (1) the association of Benelux countries in policy regarding Germany; (2) the role of German economy in the European economy, and the control of the Ruhr; (3) security against Germany; (4) evolution of the political and economic organization of Germany; and (5) provisional territorial arrangements.

The Soviet Union again challenged the right of the Western Powers to hold these discussions. An article appearing in Pravda and broadcast over the Moscow radio on April 25 declared that all the items on the agenda were "exclusively the prerogative of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which alone can make decisions on these questions," and that "no other decision can or will have the force of law and international authority."

Elections in the American Zone

Municipal elections were held on April 25 in the United States occupation areas of Hesse and Bavaria. In Hesse, the Social Democrats received 35.7 per cent of the votes, and the Christian Democrats were second with 29 per cent. Dr. Erich Koehler, chairman of the Bizonal Economic Council, expressed the view that the election results were "a clear acceptance of the Marshall plan, which will mean a confirmation of the policies of those factions in the council which stand for European co-operation."

In Bavaria, partial returns at the end of the month showed the Christian Social Union (Christian Democrats) leading, the Social Democrats second, and the Communists sixth, with only a small percentage of votes. U. S. Military Governor General Clay said on the 29th that the decline in the communist vote (in both Hesse and Bavaria) was an "indication that the German people [desired] a political structure in which there was individual freedom."

2. Japan

Strikes and Industrial Unrest

In the course of the month, a number of incidents revealing industrial and economic stress occurred in Japan. Following intervention by occupation authorities, government workers' union headquarters in Tokyo called, on April 1, an end to the succession of twenty-four-hour strikes which had disrupted telephone, telegraph, and postal services in large sections of Japan for over a week. On the same day, Premier Hitoshi Ashida told a Diet committee that his cabinet was "studying whether or not Japan needs a law such as the Taft-Hartley Act." Two days later, however, the government workers' unions accepted a basic monthly wage of 2,920 yen offered by the government in March. This represented an increase of 1,120 yen a month.

Plans for immediate wage-price stabilization were delayed until June 1 by the passage on April 7 of an act giving the Japanese Diet power to fix rail, telegraph, and postal rates. An average increase of 180 per cent in rail rates had been planned and would have been effected almost automatically, had rate-fixing powers been left with the officials of the government-owned companies. The new measure upheld the recommendations of the Allied Headquarters' government section which considered the law a gain for democracy.

Premier Hitoshi Ashida told a conference of labor leaders, management representatives, and members of parliament on April 10 that the government was considering an increase of 20 to 30 per cent in rations at low controlled prices. Ashida also said that Supreme Headquarters was trying to increase the ration and added that "the government expects an increase in staple foods of some form during the current year."

Employees of Tokyo bus lines, nine electric lines, and seven railroads staged a twenty-four-hour strike on April 11, demanding a 45 per cent wage increase, as against an offer of 15 per cent by their managements.

One day earlier, the Commerce Minister announced that the government would not allocate rationed materials to plants where "production control" was in force--this being a "control" exercised by striking employees. One hundred forty-four such seizures of industry have occurred in recent months in Japan, including the country's two largest newspapers and a steel plant.

Proposed Coastal Patrol Fleet

A bill for the creation of a "marine peace preservation board" was introduced in the Japanese Diet on April 5 under the sponsorship of the Transportation Ministry to control piracy operations in coastal waters. In view of constitutional pledges that Japan refrain from the maintenance of armed forces "forever," the measure set definite limits regarding the functioning of the proposed fleet and the people needed to man it. One paragraph set forth that "no regulations in this law shall be construed as approving the board or its officials as being organized and trained as a navy or carrying out the functions of a navy."

At the Allied Control Council meeting on April 28, the British Commonwealth and Soviet members objected to General MacArthur's having approved passage of the measure without consultation with the Council, or a policy decision from the Far Eastern Commission. The Soviet member asked that Headquarters suspend application of the measure, pending a decision by the Far Eastern Commission.

Draper Mission Report

The conclusions and recommendations of the joint governmental and industrial mission to Japan and Korea, headed by Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., were outlined on April 6 insofar as they applied to Japan. The Under Secretary said that although a recovery program for Japan was envisaged as extending over four years, an expenditure of \$150 million had been proposed for this year. He added that he believed "we will be surprised to see how much that amount will do."

A summary of the opinions of the group stated that a recovery program for Japan was necessary to reduce "and eventually eliminate" United States expenditures for relief in the Far East. It was pointed out that industrial output in Japan had reached only 40 per cent of 1933 levels, that uncertainty as to the disposition of plants under the reparations program was hampering industrial recovery, and that:

"Plants which are needed and which can be used in bringing about the economic recovery of Japan should be retained and only excess capacity removed. Otherwise the United States, which is now making up the present Japanese deficit, would in effect be paying the reparation bill. In our opinion the amount of this excess capacity realistically available for reparations is not great. It is most important that the present uncertainty be removed and the reparations issue be finally settled."

The mission reached the conclusion that the United States, in its own interest, should assist in the industrial recovery of Japan. Its markets are needed throughout the Far East, which in turn depends upon Japan

as a market for potential surpluses of raw materials. Along these lines, it was suggested that Japanese imports be shifted gradually from dollar to sterling traders and Far Eastern areas. The group recognized, also, that drastic domestic, economic, and fiscal reforms entailing sacrifice would be demanded of the Japanese people.

Riots of Korean Minorities

Rioting broke out in Osaka on the 23rd when some 20,000 Koreans attacked police headquarters. The following day, 1,500 Koreans stormed prefectural headquarters in Kobe. Police and city officials were seized and held until they rescinded an order closing Korean schools, and released 73 Koreans arrested on the 15th. Both actions were immediately countermanded by Brig. Gen. Menoher, commander of the Kobe base. Lieut. Gen. Eichelberger declared a state of emergency in the area, placing Japanese police under direct orders of the American provost marshal, and ordering American troops to assist in arresting rioters. The disturbances were regarded by both Japanese and American officials as Communist-inspired.

3. Austria

Meeting of Foreign Ministers' Deputies

Soviet claims against Austria, which had been somewhat modified by concessions made during March meetings, were further reduced on April 5. The Western Powers, in turn, made upward revisions in their position, with the result that the gap between the two sides was considerably narrowed. The outcome of the meeting held on the 5th was that the Soviet Union had decreased its claim to Austria's current oil production to 60 per cent for a period of 30 years, while the Western Powers were prepared to agree to at least 58 per cent. Further, the Soviet Union demanded only 60 per cent of the oil exploration rights over an eight year period--exploitation to run for a further 25 years--as against the Western offer of 47 per cent.

The Soviet Government had also agreed to reduce its demand for oil refineries from a capacity of 450,000 tons to a capacity of 420,000 tons, as previously suggested by the Western Allies. However, on this issue there was a wide divergence of view between Soviet estimates of capacity already under the control of that country, and the estimates of the Western Powers. Instead of 25 per cent of total Danube Shipping Company assets in Austria, the Soviet Union stated it was prepared to accept all the assets in the Soviet zone alone. It had reduced its demands for a cash payment from \$200 million to \$150 million and had offered to accept payment over a period of six years, instead of two. It continued to insist on unrestricted export of profits and immunity from nationalization of property transferred to it.

The Western Powers took under advisement the new Soviet proposals with regard to the Danube Shipping Company and the cash payment of \$150 million. They indicated that under certain conditions they might be prepared to go beyond their earlier suggestion for a cash payment of \$100 million.

As no further progress was made during the next few days, the British deputy, supported by the United States and French representatives, proposed on the 9th that the assets question be dropped for the time being and that the delegates turn their attention to other unsettled articles of the treaty. These included Yugoslavia's claim to Austrian Carinthia, \$150 million in reparation payments, and the problem of arming the troops to be permitted to Austria following the treaty settlement.

The Soviet delegate rejected the proposal that the Commission should temporarily cease considering the assets question. Therefore, discussion of this item continued for several more days. On the 13th, however, after the Western Powers had made it clear that they regarded Soviet claims to assets of the Danube Shipping Company as excessive, the Soviet deputy suddenly reversed his attitude and declared himself willing to proceed to other clauses in the draft treaty. He suggested that the Commission should begin with the question of Yugoslavia's frontier claims.

The United States at first demurred, pointing out that Yugoslavia's claims had been twice rejected by the Western Powers during 1947 (at the London meeting in January and again at Moscow in March). It was finally agreed that, if Yugoslavia presented a written memorandum to the Commission containing any new proposals, both Yugoslavia and Austria would be given a hearing.

The Deputies next took up the question of arming the troops that Austria would be entitled to maintain under the peace settlement. The Soviet Union had hitherto insisted that supplies for these forces must be manufactured within Austria. After the British deputy pointed out that this would impose a severe burden on the Austrian economy and that such a provision had not been included in other treaty settlements, the Soviet deputy withdrew this demand.

Other treaty clauses discussed during the next few days included those relating to military arrangements, repatriation of displaced persons, and guarantees of Austria's independence, but virtually no progress was recorded. By the 28th, Yugoslavia had submitted a memorandum listing its claims against Austria, and the Deputies turned to a discussion of this question.

Yugoslavia reduced its claim on Carinthia, but otherwise its demands remained virtually the same as those already rejected by the Western Powers. In addition to a large part of Carinthia, the memorandum asked for the surrender of part of Styria, for demilitarization of the frontier, and for \$150 million in reparation, in the form of goods and services, to be paid in seven equal annual installments.

Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber, who appeared before the Committee the next day, described Yugoslavia's reparation claims as "fantastic" and insisted on Austria's right to retain its pre-Anschluss frontiers. He pointed out that, in accordance with a decision of the Moscow Conference, Yugoslavia had already confiscated Austrian property within Yugoslav territory, which he estimated to be worth \$100 million. Gruber declared that this represented the maximum payment Austria was prepared to make to fulfill a claim it considered unjustified.

Friction Between Occupation Authorities

On April 7, the Soviet authorities asked the United Military Government to move an aviation range station out of the Soviet zone in Vienna. This action was followed by a series of moves directed against the British as well as the Americans. On the 11th, an attempt was made to force British military personnel to produce passports and identification cards before allowing them to proceed to the British zone in Vienna. This requirement, it was said, violated an Allied agreement of July 25, 1945--granting free passage by means of passes alone--and the British refused to submit to it. Similar documents were also demanded of the Americans but, as they always carried identification cards, they had shown them without protest. On the 16th, the Soviet authorities reverted to the former system of allowing access to the western zones by road or rail upon presentation of a pass.

By this time, however, a new issue had arisen. Soviet authorities had begun to refuse freedom of entry to British and American airfields--the result of alleged British violation of agreements not to use the Schwechat airport for commercial aviation. The Western Powers protested against this interference at the Allied Council meeting of the 16th, but the Soviet commander refused to discuss the matter.

U. S. Secretary of State Marshall said on the 28th that there was apparently no longer any interference with American transit rights to and from Vienna. He said note had been taken of a Tass article (April 26) "protesting against the U. S. and British use of their respective airports for commercial purposes, allegedly in violation of established international agreement." The Secretary of State continued: "Any violation by the Soviet military authorities in Austria of their obligations and of the rights of the United States in Vienna laid down by international agreement cannot be disregarded in evaluating the measure of good faith which the Soviet Government claims to bring to the Austrian treaty discussions now currently proceeding in London."

At the meeting of the Allied Control Council on the 30th, the Soviet commander proposed a new agreement to regulate air traffic over Vienna. The U. S. representative agreed to consider it only on the basis of the following principles: (1) the necessity for the right of free and unimpeded flight of aircraft between the two United States areas of occupation in Austria; and (2) the recognition of the U. S. commander in chief as the sole judge of the air requirements of the United States forces. The British and French representatives adopted similar positions.

4. Korea

Draper Mission

A statement by Percy H. Johnston, chairman of the advisory group that accompanied the Draper Mission to survey recovery problems in Japan and Korea, was released by the Department of the Army on April 6.

The mission said it believed "with General Hodge, our Military Commander, that reasonable assistance should be given to provide raw materials and give the Korean economy a better opportunity to function on its

own feet. An interim aid program not limited solely to relief, should give to a new Korean Government, when it is formed, the needed help to establish the stable economic conditions so necessary to the continuance of free democratic government."

Finally, it was said that the group "examined the proposed recovery program prepared by the Department of the Army and supported by the Department of State. The program would provide a total of \$220,000,000 for a twelve months period for raw materials and other recovery items for Japan, Korea and the Ryukyu Islands. We believe such a recovery program essential in order that we can reduce and eventually eliminate spending in these areas for relief."

Election Preparations

The United Nations Commission agreed on April 3 to postpone the South Korean elections scheduled for May 9 until the next day, after Lieut. Gen. Hodge, U. S. occupation commander, pointed out that many Koreans would consider the eclipse of the sun expected on the 9th an ill omen. The Commission on the 5th began on-the-spot observations of the pre-election situation in South Korea. These inspection tours continued throughout the month. By April 9, despite a communist-led protest marked by violence, nearly eight of the nine million adults in South Korea had registered to vote in the election. United States personnel, assisting in the ten-day registration, said that "we must have underestimated Korean interest."

A Soviet radio broadcast from Moscow on the 12th commented that "it is very indicative that the American authorities in southern Korea, who at first wanted to speed up the elections, are now rather willing to postpone them as long as possible. They obviously fear that neither the police nor falsification, to which the reactionary stage managers are resorting in preparing for the election comedy, will be able to insure the necessary demonstration of a successful application of 'democratic principles' in southern Korea."

Lieut. Gen. Hodge on the 6th characterized the Soviet-sponsored conference of "selected leaders" (scheduled for April 14 at Pyongyang) as "another effort to deceive the good people of South Korea." He said:

"In judging the intention behind this move it should be kept in mind that the United States proposed and the United Nations organization voted overwhelmingly to hold general elections throughout all Korea under the United Nations observation but the Soviet masters of the north Korean Communists seem to fear the results of any free election in north Korea and apparently do not want representatives of the United Nations to see and contact the masses of Koreans in north Korea."

He urged every man and woman over twenty-one years of age to register and vote "for their own representatives who can in truly representative capacity take steps to bring about unification of Korea."

On the 13th the Soviet-zone radio announced a temporary postponement of the gathering. A South Korea delegation to the Soviet conference

was composed of 13 members from the South Korean "Democratic Front," a communist coalition of leftist parties. In addition to these delegates, Rightist leader Dr. Kim Koo, and Liberal chieftain Dr. Kim Kiusic joined the group, arriving in Pyongyang on the 21st.

A broadcast from Pyongyang on the 23rd stated that 545 delegates, representing 46 political parties of North and South Korea, would "adopt measures to smash the sinister plottings of American imperialists to ruin our country and our people by holding separate elections." The agenda also called for delegates to "demand that foreign troops leave Korea at the earliest possible day."

On the 28th, a resolution was adopted (as announced over the North Korea radio) declaring that "under no conditions, under no circumstances, and at no time will the people ever approve separate elections in South Korea. We will do our utmost to prevent [them]"

In an effort to end alleged leftist-inspired disturbances, which had resulted in 46 deaths since April 2 on Cheju Island off the southern coast of Korea, constabulary troops surrounded the city of Cheju on April 24. Police arrested 60 suspects, 30 of whom were held. U. S. Army Headquarters in Seoul on the 27th announced the communist-led drive to prevent the elections had caused the deaths of 350 persons between January 1 and April 26 in nine South Korean provinces. Among those killed were two candidates for the Constituent Assembly, and at least seven election officials.

The Temporary Commission adopted a resolution on April 28 stating that "having satisfied itself as a result of extensive field observations ... that there exists in South Korea in a reasonable degree a free atmosphere," elections would be observed as scheduled on the 10th.

B. IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE TREATIES

1. The Italian Treaty

a) Trieste

Protest to Yugoslavia on Border Incidents

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain lodged strong protests with the Government of Yugoslavia on April 7 against a series of "incidents." The latest had occurred on March 31, when the Yugoslav forces had fired on personnel within the Anglo-American zone of Trieste. Describing these occurrences as "flagrant violations of the inter-zonal boundaries," the American note declared: "The Government of the United States trusts and expects that the Yugoslav Government will promptly issue the necessary instructions to its responsible representative to the end that there will be no repetition of such incidents... ."

The British note protested "in forceful terms against these instances of deliberate and aggressive assault," and also requested the Yugoslav Government to take steps to insure that they would not be repeated.

In notes handed to the British and American Ambassadors on April 11, the Yugoslav Government rejected these protests, alleging that the "control organs of the Allied Military Government" were responsible for the incidents of March 22 and 29. The next day, the Yugoslavs accused the Anglo-American authorities in Trieste of provoking disorders and incidents in order to justify indefinite prolongation of the occupation.

Proposal for Return of Trieste to Italy

Having received no reply to their communications to the Soviet Union of March 20 proposing the return of Trieste to Italy, the United States, Great Britain, and France presented further notes on April 9, suggesting that a meeting should be held in Paris early in May to draft the necessary amendments to the Italian treaty. The American note informed the Soviet Government that "in the interest of terminating the present unsettled situation in the Free Territory of Trieste and restoring peace and stability in the area, early action by the interested powers is required." It therefore asked for an "early expression of the views of the Soviet Government."

The Moscow radio announced on April 13 that the Soviet Government had sent notes to the Governments of Great Britain, the United States, and France, rejecting their proposals for a conference on the return of Trieste to Italy. The note to the United States was not made public, but the Soviet broadcast quoted the text of the note to Great Britain, and said that corresponding communications had been dispatched to the U. S. Department of State and the French Foreign Office. The reply to Great Britain follows in part:

"The Soviet Government draws the attention of the British Foreign Office to the fact that the peace treaty with Italy, as with other states that participated in the war, was prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers and examined in detail at the Paris conference, with the participation of twenty-one states, which subsequently signed and ratified it, and that it came into force only a few months ago.

"Hence it stands to reason that the proposal to decide the question of a revision of the peace treaty with Italy in respect to one or the other of its parts by means of correspondence or by convening private conferences is regarded by the Soviet Government as unacceptable and as violating the elementary principles of democracy."

The three governments replied to the Soviet Union on April 16 in similar manner. The United States said it could not understand why the procedure suggested for drafting an amendment to the Italian peace treaty was considered unacceptable, since the same procedure had been followed in drafting the original treaty. The memorandum concluded:

"Should the Soviet Government find it possible to agree in principle to the return of the free territory of Trieste to Italian sovereignty the Government of the United States will be glad to consider any suggestions which the Soviet Government may have regarding the procedure for the drafting of the necessary protocol to the Italian treaty."

II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

A. RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

A comprehensive analysis of Europe's most pressing economic problems, with an indication of the measures needed in order to achieve recovery, is contained in the first of a series of reports released by the Economic Commission for Europe on April 5. The study, divided into four chapters (followed by appendices), analyzes the economic plans of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union's five-year plan, and the plans of the 16 member nations of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation. The body of the survey concerned itself with:

1. The Recovery of Production. It was pointed out that in the first 18 months following the end of World War II, European countries made remarkable industrial recovery. But in the next nine months, very little further progress was achieved, although industrial production exceeded the prewar level in the last quarter of 1947.

In general, the rate of industrial recovery was much more rapid than after the First World War, with the exception of Germany. Even that country's over-all record of recovery is more favorable now than it was 27 years ago. The most serious difficulties have been in coal production, but despite the fall in German output, the total European output bore almost the same relation to prewar in 1947 as it did in 1920. Production prospects at the opening of 1948, according to the report, promised additional improvement largely because of the bettering of the coal situation.

2. Recovery in Trade. European foreign trade improved rapidly in 1946, it was noted, but only moderately well in 1947. Recovery lagged--especially in the trading of European countries with one another; such trading in 1947 was only 56 per cent of the 1938 level. Exports to non-European countries were about 78 per cent of 1938, and imports from non-European countries were 107 per cent of the same year. Great Britain, however, contrasted sharply with this general tendency of imports to expand more than exports. Disappearance of German exports had been felt most severely by the smaller Central and Eastern European nations--now receiving only a part of their former imports of chemicals, iron, and steel, machinery and other heavy industrial products.

Although the total overseas imports to Europe in 1947 were only 7 per cent above prewar, the volume of imports from the United States was 130 per cent higher than in 1938, nine-tenths of this being in the form of relief and reconstruction goods.

3. The Problem of Inflation. The survey showed that the inflationary pressure operating in many European countries--affecting both trade and productivity--was partly caused by budgetary deficits which, even in the most recent budgets, range from 40 to 60 per cent of total prewar expenditure. It was also pointed out

that the problem was different in countries with suppressed inflation from those with open inflation.

4. Balance of Payments. The study asserted that the huge deficit in the European overseas' balance of payments was the most critical feature of that continent's current economic situation. This amounted to \$5.8 million in 1946, and \$7.5 in 1947, and was largely the result of a fall in receipts from invisible items--investment income and earnings from service transactions. It was further induced by the rise in prices which made the 1947 deficit \$3.6 million higher than if foreign trade prices in terms of dollars had stayed at 1938 levels.

Inasmuch as the invisible items would not be available to cover the gap, a larger expansion of exports (mainly in the heavy industries) or contraction in imports, or some combination of both, would be needed to restore equilibrium in the balance of payments. Even if the current production plans of European countries were realized, according to the report, an equilibrium in the balance of payments by the end of the time covered by the plans could not be assured without reducing standards of living, because it would be unlikely that overseas imports--especially of foodstuffs and manufacturing equipment--could be reduced rapidly to prewar levels.

The Commission reached the conclusion that replacement of overseas imports would require expansion of production and of intra-European trade. It was pointed out that although the restoration of such trade was closely related to the further recovery of production (especially in agriculture), it was also hampered by the present commercial and financial framework of trade. European countries were recognized as tending toward strict bilateral balancing of trade between each other, under the increasing shortage of hard currency reserves and the exhaustion of credit facilities previously granted to each other.

The director of research of the ECE, in discussing the report, asserted: "We found that the permanent change in Europe's position caused by World War II is that Europe must plan to cover her imports from the rest of the world with exports, whereas heretofore one-third of European imports were paid for by income from investment services and other sources."

1. The ERP and Other Foreign Aid

Report on U.S. Foreign Relief Program

President Truman transmitted to Congress on April 13, 1948 his second report on the United States Foreign Relief Program, authorized by Congress on May 31, 1947. It was pointed out that under this post-UNRRA relief plan a total of \$350 million had been appropriated in 1947, and that aid had been provided to Austria, Greece, Italy, Trieste, and China. Forty million dollars had been reserved for the International Children's Emergency Fund, of which \$25 million had already been contributed, and \$5 million had been set aside to pay for ocean transportation of supplies shipped by private American relief agencies. Food accounted for about 95 per cent of the total shipments.

Passage of Foreign Aid Act of 1948

On April 1 the Joint Conference Committee, meeting to reconcile the foreign aid bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, agreed to remove the amendment designating Spain as one of the countries entitled to receive assistance. Senator Vandenberg pointed out that under the bill as originally drawn, membership was open to any nation upon the invitation of the participants, and the Committee felt therefore that a decision respecting Spain was "the function and the prerogative" of the 16 nations already participating in the program.

The Joint Committee completed its task late on the night of the 1st and presented a compromise bill to Congress the following day. It was promptly approved in the House by 318 votes to 75, and in the Senate by voice vote. President Truman signed the measure on April 3, and it became law under the title of the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1948." The European Recovery Program section was designated as the "Economic Co-operation Act of 1948."

The Foreign Assistance Act as finally approved authorizes expenditures totalling \$6.098 billion for foreign aid programs for a period of one year, to be distributed as follows: \$5.3 billion for the European Recovery Program; \$338 million for relief and reconstruction aid to China, and \$125 million to be used for military or any other purposes at the discretion of the Chinese Government; \$275 million for further military aid to Greece and Turkey; and \$60 million for the International Children's Emergency Fund. In addition, \$20 million is authorized from the appropriation under the Foreign Aid Act 1947 for expenditure in the Anglo-American zone of Trieste.

In order that the program might become operative as soon as possible, the Act provides for an advance of \$1 billion from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the European Recovery Program and \$50 million each for the China and Greek-Turkish aid programs.

The purposes of the Economic Co-operation Act are stated in the preamble to this section, which declares that inasmuch as "the Congress finds that the existing situation in Europe endangers the establishment of a lasting peace, the general welfare and national interest of the United States, and the attainment of the objectives of the United Nations," it shall be the policy of the United States "to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence in Europe through assistance to those countries of Europe which participate in a joint recovery program based upon self-help and mutual co-operation."

Each of the participating countries is required to conclude an agreement with the United States pledging itself to adhere to the purposes of the Act. Under the terms of these agreements, the governments will, where applicable, make specific commitments to promote industrial and agricultural production, to effect financial and monetary reforms, and to further international trade by such means as reduction of trade barriers. Further pledges required include a commitment to facilitate the transfer to the United States "for stock-piling or other purposes" of materials needed

by the United States as a "result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in such participating country after due regard for reasonable requirements for domestic use and commercial export of such country." It was also stipulated that assistance to the participating countries must not "seriously impair the economic stability of the United States."

The Act provides that the program be directed by an Administrator for Economic Co-operation appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate--the Administrator to be responsible to the President and to hold cabinet rank. The Bretton Woods Agreement Act was amended to permit him to become a member of the National Advisory Council. Provision was also made for a Deputy Administrator to be appointed by the President, and a Public Advisory Board to "advise and consult" with the Administrator on "general or basic policy matters," the members of which are to be selected from among "citizens of the United States of broad and varied experience."

The Administrator will be represented in Europe by a special appointee with the rank of Ambassador, who will also be the chief United States representative on any continuing European recovery organization. The Administrator is authorized to create a corporation with such powers as he deems necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Act. Any differences of view between the Administrator and the Secretary of State are to be referred to the President for final decision.

Of a total amount of \$5.3 billion provided under the program, \$4.3 billion may be distributed in the form of grants or loans at the discretion of the Administrator, after consultation with the National Advisory Council, \$700 million are to be used only for loans, and \$300 million are assigned to guarantee the exchange convertibility in the repayment of private loans made to the participating countries.

The Act directs that exports to nonparticipating countries be prohibited if such exports are required for the recovery program, unless they are considered to be in the interest of the United States. Further, the Administrator is instructed "to refuse delivery insofar as practicable to participating countries of commodities which go into the production of any commodity for delivery to any nonparticipating European country which commodity would be refused export licenses to those countries by the United States in the interest of national security."

The final act provides for continuous review of the program by a joint congressional committee composed of three members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, three members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and two members each from the House and Senate Appropriations Committee. The termination date for the program is fixed at June 30, 1952.

In the section entitled the "China Aid Act of 1948," the policy of the United States is said to be "to encourage the Republic of China and its people to exert sustained common efforts which will speedily achieve ... internal peace and economic stability in China," and "to encourage the Republic of China in its efforts to maintain the genuine independence and

administrative integrity of China, and to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty and free institutions in China through a program of assistance based on self-help and co-operation."

Total aid to China is fixed at the figure of \$463 million proposed by the Senate, instead of the \$570 provided for in the House bill, but military aid was increased by \$25 million to \$125 million, thereby reducing economic aid to \$338 million.

Following passage of the Foreign Aid Act, British Prime Minister Attlee sent a message to President Truman expressing the "deep gratification" of the British people at "this act of unparalleled generosity and statesmanship." A joint message in similar vein was received by Secretary of State Marshall from British Foreign Secretary Bevin and French Foreign Minister Bidault. In China, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh spoke of Chinese appreciation of the enactment of the China Aid Act, stressing "the uplifting effect of the passage of the Act on the morale of the Chinese people."

Enactment of the aid legislation was noted in both Pravda and Izvestia on April 4. In its dispatch to these papers, Tass said that although "a strong wave of protest in Europe" had led to elimination of any mention of Spain from the Economic Co-operation Act, the Department of State intended to include that country in the program at a later date.

Establishment of Economic Co-operation Administration

It was announced on April 6 that President Truman had nominated Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Studebaker Automobile Corporation, to be Administrator for Economic Co-operation. His nomination was unanimously confirmed by the Senate the next day. Hoffman said he had accepted the post because he believed it offered "an opportunity to put up a fight for peace." He expressed the view that "one of the best antidotes to communism is a reasonable degree of prosperity." The new Administrator stated that the goal of the European Recovery Program was to increase production by at least one third, but he emphasized that, although American assistance was needed in the attainment of this objective, its successful realization depended upon "a much greater program of mutual aid among European countries than ever existed in the prewar period." Hoffman indicated that, in carrying out this program, he would endeavor to encourage a revival of trade between Eastern and Western Europe and between Europe and the Far East.

It was announced on April 21 that President Truman had nominated Commerce Secretary W. Averell Harriman to be U. S. Special Representative in Europe under the Economic Co-operation Act. The Senate approved this appointment on the 26th. Commenting on Harriman's selection for this post, Hoffman said that his "professional knowledge of Europe, his understanding of both its potentialities and its problems, make him almost the indispensable man."

On the 9th, Hoffman announced authorization of the first purchases under the European Recovery Program, comprising \$21 million in supplies for Austria, Greece, France, the Netherlands, and Italy. By the end of April he had authorized some \$74.27 million under the European Recovery Program

for emergency procurement of food and fuel for France, Italy, Austria, Greece, and the Netherlands. Before a wider measure of assistance can be afforded, however, each country participating in the program will be required to file a "letter of intent" committing it to conclude a bilateral treaty with the United States in accordance with the terms of the Economic Co-operation Act--the final date for submission of such letters being July 3. By the 28th, letters had already been received from France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark.

Appropriation of ERP Funds

President Truman asked Congress on April 14 to appropriate \$4.245 billion to cover European Recovery Program requirements. This sum represented the balance of the \$5.3 billion authorized by Congress for this purpose, after taking into account the \$1 billion already provided for in the form of an advance from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the \$55 million appropriated on March 31 as an emergency measure.

The next day (15th), Representative John Taber, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, announced that his Committee would begin hearings on this request on the 19th, and that they might last for two weeks. He pointed out that the Committee intended "to go fully into the needs and requirements of each country and our capacity to fill them," and that in order to determine "how much should be appropriated and the ability of this country to fill the gaps," the group would examine the comparative prewar and postwar production figures of each of the 16 nations participating in the program. Taber added that the committees that had recommended the aid authorization had not made these investigations.

The House Appropriations Committee actually began hearings on the European Recovery Program on April 21. The first witness to appear was Economic Co-operation Administrator Paul G. Hoffman, who urged appropriation of the full amount of \$5.3 billion authorized for the first year of operation of the program. Pointing out that this sum was lower than the estimates of the Harriman Committee and the International Bank, Hoffman added: "My great fear is that even with the most careful planning and the most vigorous supervision of expenditures, this amount may prove insufficient to accomplish the degree of recovery we seek."

Herter Committee Reports

Four additional reports were issued by the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid during April on various phases of European economic developments (see Selected List of Documents). Of special interest in connection with current ERP activities was one on "The Place of the United States in European Industrial Development," issued on the 23rd, which stated:

"It has correctly been urged that the United States must fully appreciate the problems and views of the Europeans and should not attempt to force upon them its own ideas of industrial management. On the other hand, the Europeans must equally appreciate that needless inefficiencies will, in the long run, result in greater requirements for United States assistance. The Administrator of the European

Recovery Program will have a very real responsibility to this Nation to see that wholehearted effort is made by the Europeans to minimize inefficiencies and to obtain increased output through co-operation and integrated effort."

Ways in which the United States could usefully assist in increasing the efficiency of European industry were suggested, and it was recommended that the Economic Co-operation Administrator work through the European group organization rather than through individual countries, in order to encourage the maximum co-ordination.

Convention Establishing Organization for European Economic Co-Operation

Representatives of 16 Western European nations and of the western zones of Germany met in Paris on April 16 to sign documents establishing a permanent organization for economic co-operation between their countries. In presenting the agreements for signature, the rapporteur-générale of the conference emphasized that they were not limited to the duration of the European Recovery Program, but were of a permanent character.

The documents included resolutions on the functions of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation and on the relations between the Organization and the United States special representative in Europe, as well as a Convention for European Economic Co-operation. Its preamble declares that the participating nations--recognizing the need for "a strong and prosperous European economy," realizing that "the prosperity of each of them depends on the prosperity of all," and that only by "close and lasting co-operation ... can the prosperity of Europe be restored and maintained"--are "resolved to implement the principles and to achieve the aims set forth in the general report of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation," and to "achieve and maintain a satisfactory level of economic activity without extraordinary outside assistance."

Article I of the Convention provides for the contracting parties "to work in close co-operation in their economic relations with one another," and, "as their immediate task," to "undertake the elaboration and execution of a joint recovery program." In Articles 2 and 3, the signatories agreed "to promote with vigor the development of production through efficient use of the resources at their command, whether in their metropolitan or overseas territories," and to "draw up general programs for the production and exchange of commodities and services." Article 4 reads in part:

"The contracting parties will develop in mutual co-operation the maximum possible interchange of goods and services. To this end they will continue the efforts already initiated to achieve as soon as possible multilateral system of payments among themselves and will co-operate in relaxing restrictions on trade and payments between one another."

Under Article 5, the participants "agree to strengthen their economic links" and to "continue the study of customs unions, or analogous arrangements." It is further provided that "those contracting parties that already have agreed in principle to the creation of customs unions will further the establishment of such unions as rapidly as conditions permit."

Article 6 declares that the contracting parties will "co-operate with other like-minded countries in reducing tariff and other barriers to the expansion of trade, with a view to achieving a sound and balanced multilateral trading system such as will accord with the principles of the Havana Charter."

Each participating state promised, under Article 7, to "take such steps as lie within its power to achieve or maintain the stability of its currency and of its internal financial position, sound rates of exchange and, generally, confidence in its monetary system." Article 8 says in part: "The contracting parties will make the fullest and most effective use of their available manpower. They will endeavor to provide full employment for their own people and they may have recourse to the manpower available in the territory of any other contracting party." The signatories agree in Article 9 to "furnish the organization with all the information it may request of them to facilitate the accomplishment of its tasks."

The second part of the Convention deals with the functions and powers of the permanent organization. The long-term objective of this body, as set forth in Article 11, is stated as "the achievement of a sound European economy through the economic co-operation of the members." The immediate task is "to insure the success of the European Recovery Program." The functions of the new body are defined as follows:

"To prepare and implement, within the sphere of the collective action of the parties concerned, the measures necessary to achieve the aim laid down in Article 11... . To provide for systems of observation and review adequate to ensure the efficient use both of external aid and of indigenous resources. To provide the United States Government with ... assistance and information ... and to address recommendations to that Government. At request of the interested parties, to assist in the negotiation of such international agreements as may be necessary for the better execution of the European Recovery Program."

The organization is empowered to: "Take decision for the implementation by members; enter into agreements with its members, nonmember countries, the United States Government and international organizations; make recommendations to the United States Government, to other Governments and to international organizations." Decisions, except where otherwise agreed in special instances, are to be made "by mutual agreement of all the members," and "the abstention of any members declaring themselves not to be interested in the subject under discussion shall not invalidate decisions, which shall be binding for the other members."

The organization is to consist of a council composed of all the members, assisted by an executive committee of seven members, a secretary-general and his staff. The organization is required to "establish ... formal or informal relationships with the United Nations, its principal organs ... subsidiary bodies ... and specialized agencies," and is empowered to maintain relationships with other international bodies."

The convention will come into force "upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by not less than six of the signatories." Any non-signatory country may accede to it, "with the assent of the Council of the

Organization," at any time after "not less than ten instruments of ratification ... have been deposited." Provision is also made for expulsion of members and voluntary termination of their participation.

Following the signature of the documents, which British Foreign Secretary Bevin called "the end of the beginning," and French Foreign Minister Bidault described as "unique in the history of our old continent," a message of appreciation for American aid was sent to the Government of the United States. A meeting of the permanent Council was held later in the day (16th), at which Belgian Premier Spaak was elected chairman after Bevin had withdrawn. The vice-chairmanships went to Greece and Denmark. Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, of Great Britain, was appointed chairman of the executive committee, and Robert Marjolin of France was named secretary-general.

The executive committee on April 23 started work on the revision of production and distribution programs drawn up in 1947, so that they would conform to the provisions of the Economic Co-operation Act.

Five-Power Currency Talks

The finance ministers of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, meeting in Brussels at the close of April, decided upon the establishment of a large financial pool to increase trade among its five members, according to financial experts of the British Government. The plan--comparable to the International Fund--will be presented to the other 11 Marshall plan countries, for the purpose of removing barriers to trade and establishing a common European currency. Under the plan, scheduled to be announced in May, each of the five participants would contribute to the pool an amount of its own currency determined by its estimated purchases from the other signatory countries over a definite period of time.

Labor and the European Recovery Program

The first meeting of the International European Recovery Program Advisory Committee, set up in March by the conference of trade unions of countries participating in the ERP, took place in London on April 23. The principal objective of the Committee was to determine how to procure the co-operation of the workers in the recovery program. It was resolved that the chairman and secretary should make recommendations to the next meeting on "effective liaison and co-operation in the general administration of the recovery program on the international level."

Late in the month the meeting of the Executive Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Unions on the European Recovery Program opened in Rome. (This had been called after the British Trades Union Congress had taken the initiative on the March meeting, noted above, over the initial refusal of the WFTU secretariat to convene such a conference). On the 30th, the American, British, and Dutch delegations succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of a manifesto, sent to national centers by the secretariat in connection with Labor Day, which had been worded in a manner apparently condemning the ERP. The meeting was sharply controversial over the differences of view between Communists and non-Communists on the recovery program.

2. International Long-Term Development

Export-Import Bank Lending Authority Extension

President Truman asked the Congress on April 8 to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank by \$500 million to assist "in meeting essential requirements for the financing of economic development in the other American Republics." In his message, the President said:

"Substantial and continued progress in the development of the resources and industries of the other American Republics ... requires foreign financing. The United States, by reason of its close relations with these countries and its strong economic position, is the principal source to which the other American Republics look for equipment, materials and technology as well as for their financing. ...

"It is of great importance to the United States, as a member of the American community, that there be continued expansion of production, increasing trade activity and rising standards of living in the other American Republics. It is in our mutual interest to help develop in the countries to the south those essential materials which are becoming less abundant in the United States, as well as others regularly imported from distant regions. ..."

The President also pointed out that this increase in lending authority should not be considered as a substitute for action by the American Republics to encourage private foreign investment within their individual countries.

Economic Questions at the Bogotá Conference

The Ninth International Conference of American States, meeting at Bogotá during April, was chiefly concerned with political and security problems (see Part IV below), but also included in its final Act a pact for basic economic co-operation in the Americas. In the course of the Economic Commission's discussions of the Draft Agreement on Economic Co-operation, the United States proposed a series of amendments (April 8) including: assurance that internationally financed projects are economic and will not require "permanent protection or subsidy"; "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" to be paid in cases of expropriation; more liberal taxes to be levied on foreign income; abolition of unfair restrictions on goods needed for economic development; equitable administration of essential export restrictions; reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade; and national treatment of private foreign investments.

As at the Havana Conference on Trade and Employment, the Bogotá Conference economic discussions revolved around major controversies over foreign investment guarantees and preferential trade arrangements. By the end of the month, the basic economic agreement was ready for signature, with a section on private investments including all the United States amendments designed to safeguard investments, especially against loss through expropriation, and sections on financial and technical co-operation and co-operation for economic development, including principles for handling short-supply items in times of scarcity.

Other important subjects of controversy were omitted from the agreement and will be sent for study to a special Inter-American Economic Conference in Buenos Aires this fall. On commercial policy, the Economic Commission on the 27th actually adopted an article (14 to 4, despite United States opposition) granting states within the same economic region the right to establish preferential tariff agreements with a view to promoting economic development, which would not be extended to other states except by special agreement. The U. S. delegation declared this to be contrary to the Havana accord, and rather than reopen that whole issue at Bogotá, it was decided to postpone a more detailed discussion until Buenos Aires.

Other proposals to be considered at Buenos Aires include an inter-American development corporation, and inter-American institute of commerce, short-term commercial credit requirements, and an inter-American bank--this last suggested by Argentina. The new institution was proposed by the president of the Central Bank of Argentina, Orlando Maroglio, who declared that, although the major responsibility for world reconstruction was with the United States, Argentina could finance the new banking institution which would furnish a necessary mechanism to speed up the financial and economic development of the American states. The Paraguayan delegate moved that the Argentine delegate be instructed to prepare a detailed plan for the new bank for presentation to the Economic Commission, but the United States (through Secretary of Commerce Harriman) succeeded in sending the proposal to a working committee for detailed consideration. In view of time limitations, it was decided, on the 22nd, to postpone further action on the bank until the later economic conference.

Economic Commission for Europe: Report of Steel Committee

In a report on the European steel situation, released by the Steel Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe on April 7, emphasis was placed on the importance of building up the European steel output to reduce dependence on the United States for heavy machinery and steel products. The study was considered especially significant because the Steel Committee is the first group to survey the general European steel situation, including all the Marshall plan countries as well as Australia, Canada, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the western zones of Germany.

The conclusion was reached that "it will be impossible to cover the requirements fully because producing countries will have to export outside Europe some 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 tons for various reasons, such as the procurement of foreign exchange or indirect barter." It was also stated that a survey of the steel scrap situation in the states represented on the Steel Committee is being carried on, and that a gap of about three million tons between the total import requirements of the participating countries and export availabilities can be closed only by increasing the scrap-collection rate. The Committee further asked the German bizonal authorities to re-examine the Ruhr coking program. A bottleneck still exists in coke for steel making despite a recent revision of the program and of allocations of metallurgical coke, as recommended by the Committee.

Economic Commission for Europe: Third Session

The third session of the Economic Commission for Europe opened in Geneva on April 26. Among the 27 countries represented, Albania, Hungary, and Bulgaria were present for the first time. The only European nations absent were Spain (not having been invited) and Portugal. In his speech welcoming the delegates, Gunnar Myrdal, executive secretary of the Commission, suggested that the recently released report on the present economic situation in Europe would serve as an aid to the Commission in determining its future work.

The Polish delegate on the 27th stated that his government wished to see the valuable work of the Commission continued, but that German production problems should have been handled by the Allied Control Council in Berlin rather than by the Commission. The following day, the Soviet delegate declared that the technical committees had served the commercial interests of Great Britain and the United States. He reiterated the charges of the Polish delegate on the preceding day with respect to the handling of German problems, stating that "any question regarding the Saar may be settled only by the Council of Foreign Ministers in connection with the peace treaty." Hector McNeil of Great Britain, who replied to the Soviet speech, stated that no government was attempting to divert the Commission from its main task--the recovery of Europe. "It is a matter of regret," he added, "that the Soviet Government have not found themselves able to take part in the work of the committees and subcommittees."

A proposal that the Commission undertake labor functions was introduced by the Soviet delegate on the 29th. Stating that the International Labor Organization was dominated by governments and employers not interested in the workers, he urged the Commission not to let fear of duplication prevent it from providing a body to work in the whole field of manpower requirements, labor conditions, and welfare. This move was opposed by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Sweden.

Proposed Economic Commission for the Middle East

The United Nations ad hoc committee on the proposed Economic Commission for the Middle East held its first meeting at Lake Success on April 15. In addition to the big five states, there were present Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey. The problem of potential membership and the scope of the Commission was the main concern of the meeting. The group invited a representative of the Arab League to participate (without vote) in its work, and on April 19 agreed to invite the Governments of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen to present their views on the proposed Commission before May 1. It was also decided, with the Soviet Union abstaining, to consult Trans-Jordan (not a United Nations member).

On the 20th, the committee established a subcommittee to study and report on the territorial definition of the term "Middle East." It also heard a representative of the Greek Government on the 22nd present the Greek case for membership in the Commission, which was based on geographic position and economic structure, and the claim that Greece, together with Turkey, would form a link between the Commission for the Middle East and that for Europe.

Food and Agriculture Organization: Meetings of Council and Conference

The eighteen-member Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization opened a two-weeks' session in Washington on April 5 to review current developments in the world food and agriculture situation. A report presented to the group asserted that "the world still needs more than one good crop year even to restore prewar levels of food supplies in all areas." Grain crop losses in Europe (excluding the Soviet Union and the four Danube basin nations) were cited as the "most important single factor in the present world food shortage."

On the 8th, the Council heard a report on the International Emergency Food Council, which, after illustrating the benefits of the IEFC "system of international co-operation," went on to declare that:

"The number of firm trade agreements with which commodity committees have had to contend in the development of allocation recommendations has increased steadily. These agreements are exerting increasing pressure on the movement of cereals, fats and oils, fertilizers, meat and dairy products. In the case of meat, bilateral trade agreements came to form a distribution pattern so rigid that allocation recommendations tended to become merely an inventory of such agreements, and were discontinued."

Meeting alternately with the Council, a special session of the FAO conference was opened in Washington on April 6, with 49 nations in attendance. Sir John Boyd Orr told the group that he hoped it would act favorably on the applications for membership of Turkey and Ceylon. At the afternoon session (6th), Turkey became the fifty-sixth member by a vote of 49 to 0. Ceylon was also unanimously elected to membership on the 14th. On the same day, the conference chose Norris E. Dodd, U. S. Under Secretary of Agriculture, to succeed Sir John Boyd Orr as Director-General.

International Tin Study Group

Representatives from the 13 principal tin-producing and consuming countries met in Washington from April 19 to 24 to review the world tin situation. The Bolivian Ambassador in Washington said on the 19th that his country either would like to see the price of tin raised from \$.90 a pound to at least \$1.07, or the return of the metal to the free market. The Ambassador stated that, in his view, one of these moves was necessary to increase stockpiling in the United States. He also suggested the revival of the prewar international agreement for tin control, which had been a producers' agreement only.

Completing its work on the 22nd, the session established a working group scheduled to meet at The Hague in June to determine whether an international understanding would be "appropriate and practicable." The study group found, in reviewing the tin situation, that production is falling below earlier estimates and will probably not be sufficient to meet estimated world needs until 1950.

B. COMMERCIAL POLICY

1. International Trade Organization

Adherence of Czechoslovakia to the General Agreement

The provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, negotiated at Geneva in 1947, relating to trade between the United States and Czechoslovakia, were put into effect on April 21, 1948 by presidential proclamation. In making this announcement the 22nd, the Department of State said:

"The proclamation implements an obligation entered into by this government last October 30 when the General Agreement was concluded at Geneva with 22 other countries. The attitude of the Government of the United States towards the events of last February in Czechoslovakia was publicly indicated in the joint statement of February 26, 1948 by ... this government and ... the Governments of the United Kingdom and France. It has not changed. These events, however, do not directly affect the legal status of the reciprocal obligations under the General Agreement.

"The President's action followed receipt of a communication from the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing this government that the Government of Czechoslovakia had signed the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement and had thereby obligated itself to put the General Agreement into effect. Since Czechoslovakia has now placed the General Agreement in effect with respect to the United States and the other contracting parties, this country as well as the other contracting parties are obligated to apply the Agreement to Czechoslovakia. ..."

2. Renewal of the Trade Agreements Act

Closed Hearings Proposal

On April 23, the Tariff Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee announced that hearings on the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act would be held in closed session between May 3 and 9. Representative Doughton, ranking Democratic member of the Committee, remarked that "this decision for secret hearings will come as a distinct surprise to the American people since Republican members have complained that the negotiation of trade agreements with foreign countries has been carried on behind closed doors. ... This [action] may mean a return to the secrecy in which the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act was written behind closed doors with high-tariff lobbyists for special interests."

Limiting amendments to the Act have been proposed along the following lines: extension for one year only instead of the requested three; the required renegotiation of existing agreements that do not contain an escape clause; and the prohibition of reductions except within limits set by the Tariff Commission. On April 14, Representative Earl R. Lewis of Ohio introduced a separate bill to amend existing tariff legislation to

require that "in negotiating and concluding foreign trade agreements ... the President shall not alter the United States tariff rates ... except within the maximum and minimum limits set by the United States Tariff Commission as not likely to injure the domestic industry or domestic producers concerned."

Secretary of State Marshall told the annual convention of the Chamber of Commerce on the 27th that the trade agreements program ranks equally with the European aid program, and he called for consistency in these two phases of our foreign program. Two days later, in press conference remarks, the President warned that if Congress failed to renew the authority to negotiate trade agreements in essentially its present form, it would sabotage the foreign policy which the country has undertaken, and make repayment of loans under the European Recovery Program impossible.

C. SOCIAL POLICY

1. International Social Co-operation

World Health Organization

The final ratification necessary to establish the World Health Organization was deposited at Lake Success on April 7. On that date the Ukrainian S.S.R., Byelorussia, and Mexico announced that they had ratified the organization's constitution. However, ratification has not yet been completed by the United States.

On April 8, the executive secretary invited the United States to send an observer to the first session of the World Health Assembly, to be held in Geneva in June. Denmark's instrument of ratification was received on the 19th, and shortly thereafter, that of Afghanistan, bringing the total number of member nations adhering to the constitution to 29.

2. Displaced Persons

U.S. Legislation: Fellows Bill

On April 5, a Judiciary Subcommittee of the House of Representatives approved a bill providing for the admission of 200,000 displaced persons from Europe into the United States during the next two years. The House measure—known as the Fellows Bill—authorizes the appointment of a co-ordinator by the President to work with the Departments of State and Justice on the admission of displaced persons to the United States, and with the Department of the Interior, the 48 states, and the International Refugee Organization on the allocation of these persons. According to IRO statistics, the Bill would provide refuge for about 23 per cent of the 835,000 displaced persons still in Europe. The full House Judiciary Committee approved the Fellows Bill on the 29th.

III. POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The difficulties involved in assessing accurately the power position of the Soviet Union in the world today were highlighted in a report released on April 22 by the House of Representatives Select Committee on Foreign Aid. In this connection, the study pointed out that not only are accurate statistics not available, but the situation is:

"... further complicated by the fact that before the war partisans of the Soviet Government stressed the strength of the Soviet regime, while critics stressed its weaknesses; since the end of the war, however, it is the critics of the Soviet regime who have stressed its strength, while the defenders of the system abroad have stressed its weaknesses. The reason for this is not hard to find. Before the war the Soviet Union was seeking support in other countries and needed to show that it would not be a liability in an economic alliance. Now, however, the Soviet Union's friends seek to show that as a result of the sufferings undergone by the Soviet population during the war, the Soviet Government would be incapable of any major aggressive act. ..."

But the study warned that "it would appear incorrect to argue that the Soviet Union which, in the final analysis, produced the bulk of the supplies used in its fight against the Germans is not now strong enough to undertake substantial military operations, should the need arise." It indicated that "the difference between total Soviet industrial output and American output, to a large extent, may be offset, in terms of European power politics, by the fact that the United States requires tremendous amounts of shipping in order to supply Europe, whereas the Soviet Union is there on the spot." It was stressed, however, that "shortage of railway equipment and of internal water transport limits Soviet ability to move on a mass scale."

A. POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND FREE INSTITUTIONS

1. France

Internal Economic Developments

Reaffirming their demand for a 20 per cent increase in wages, the Communists launched an attack against the government on the 1st of April for having failed to cut food prices. Through the Confédération Générale du Travail, dominated by the Communist party, a three-day meeting in Paris of delegates from the industrial committees of all industries and branch industries in France was called. These industrial committees possess legal authorization and are largely dominated by Communists. The secretary of the Confédération, in sounding the keynote of the gathering, said that "above all, we must paralyze the efforts of those who are leading the country to ruin, chaos and unemployment under foreign domination and to war on behalf of American expansionists." Other unrest at the beginning of the month was evidenced in demonstrations carried out in the nationalized electric, power, and gas works of the Paris area against dismissals of communist officials in these industries.

The three-day meeting of the Confédération delegates ended on April 4 with a plenary session. The gathering unanimously adopted resolutions which reaffirmed the claim for a 20 per cent wage increase, and sought to obtain greater power for the industrial or works committees. Committee meetings before the plenary session were devoted largely to attacks against capitalism, large profits, and the policy of the government in subjecting French industry to the desires of "American imperialists." In his concluding speech, the communist secretary of the Confédération Générale du Travail asserted that "De Gaulle will find across the road which leads to power an impassable barrier manned by the working class." The secretary also promised that the working class would "take its responsibilities" in the tests lying ahead.

The government on the 7th, in order to guard against widespread labor unrest or disorder that might result in the breaking off of communications between Paris and the various regions, appointed eight "inspectors-general on a special mission," with full powers in case of need. All police or military forces necessary for the maintenance of order would come under the control of these delegates appointed by the Minister of the Interior. The political bureau of the Communist party said the naming of these "super-prefects" was a "return to the methods of Vichy."

The Force Ouvrière, the anti-communist labor federation led from the Confédération Générale du Travail by Leon Jouhaux in December 1947, opened its first national congress on the 12th with over 1,000 delegates in attendance. The secretary told the gathering that the membership of the new organization had reached 1.5 million and would soon be larger than that of the Confédération. Foreign observers, including one from the United States, were present at the sessions. The decision was reached to retain the name "CGT Force Ouvrière" and to ask for continued affiliation with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The minority who voted against membership in the WFTU declared that it was in the hands of a communist majority and that consequently the new group would have no chance of admission. The congress--the primary purpose of which was to act as a constituent assembly to elect leaders and decide on policy--closed on April 13.

Internal Political Developments

In mid-April, leaders of three major political groupings made appeals to the French people. Gen. de Gaulle, speaking at the first national congress of the Reunion du Peuple Francais in Marseille on the 17th, said that "co-operation between America and Europe ... must surpass the economic domain and take on the character of a political and strategic guarantee that may, however, be reciprocal." He added that France should become the "physical and moral center" of Western European nations for common defense. De Gaulle also reiterated his demand for general elections for a new National Assembly and asked for a reorganization of the national defense.

The congress, composed of about 2,000 delegates, approved 41 resolutions, and expressed views on nearly every phase of French life. One resolution supported the Marshall plan in mild terms, another urged the establishment of armored forces in certain sections of France, while a

third condemned the National Assembly as lacking "energy, coherence and continuity."

On April 18, de Gaulle made another speech in Marseille to a crowd of about 100,000, in which he especially attacked the Soviet Union. He said: "The Soviet Union, no matter how strong its resources and in spite of the facilities that its masters find in their absolute dictatorship, would never have risked expansion at this time if it did not have before it a disarrayed Europe, and if it did not have in all countries of the world organized supporters." This talk concluded the congress of the Reunion du Peuple Francais, which had purposely met in Marseille to prove that fear of a communist grip on the city was exaggerated. While the Communists did hold a demonstration, it was not near the de Gaullist meeting place. One of eight newly appointed inspectors-general, named by the Schuman government to maintain order, was in charge of the police and military arrangements for the congress.

Communist leader Maurice Thorez also spoke on the 18th in Paris. He called for union "to throw off United States domination for the ideals of the Soviet revolution." Premier Schuman talked in Poitiers on the same day, asking his countrymen to help him by setting aside political aims to advance the slowly progressing reconstruction of the country. He praised United States aid to France.

The National Assembly reconvened on April 20. On the same day, Vincent Auriol, President of France, declared: "It is not the conquest of power by this or that group that is wanted by the people of France but security in our economy, stability in our finances, a balance of wages and prices, and above all an international organization of peace."

Speaking at Rambouillet on the 25th, former Finance Minister René Pleven, leader of a group of center deputies of the Assembly known as the Rassemblement des Gauches, urged the inclusion of de Gaullists in the cabinet, observing: "The people are tired of our divisions and our party propaganda and they instinctively demand that to assume her role in the great European transformation that is about to take place, France must be guided by a broad union of democrats whose allegiance is strictly French."

Premier Schuman also made it quite plain that he did not favor the immediate election desired by the de Gaullists, declaring that the political stability of the country should not all the time be called in question. Foreign Minister Bidault (25th) recognized that union was necessary among Frenchmen in the present "delicate" international situation, but said it must be realized "within the framework of the political and spiritual diversity of France, and not through an attempt to obliterate this diversity." He urged the retention of the party system, without which "there can be no democracy."

2. Italy

National Elections

As election day approached in Italy, both sides intensified their campaigns. In the north, in particular, many former supporters of the Nenni

Socialists joined the right-wing group. In the south, where the Communists had made considerable gains by promising to divide the land among the peasants, the Christian Democrats undertook a vigorous campaign to counteract their influence.

The United States increased its endeavors to influence the elections by urging American citizens to write to their friends in Italy and to enjoin them to vote against the Communists. A series of short-wave broadcasts was also inaugurated. The People's Front promptly denounced United States efforts, stating that "hundreds of thousands of letters" were arriving in Italy.

Italy received further encouragement on April 12, when it was announced that the Tripartite Gold Commission in Brussels had decided "to allow almost in full the Italian claim for the restitution of gold taken from Italy by the Nazis." Thus Italy, which received only \$4 million at the first distribution on October 17, 1947 when only a part of its claim was recognized, was promised a further \$31 million.

Signs of a weakening in the communist hold over labor were seen on the 12th, when less than a third of the workers throughout the country responded to a call from the General Confederation of Labor for a one-hour work stoppage.

U. S. Ambassador Dunn, who made numerous speeches during the electoral campaign--pointing out how much the United States was doing to aid Italy--was denounced for his actions by the Communists. On the 13th, Communist leader Togliatti protested to Foreign Minister Count Sforza against "the interference of a foreign Ambassador in our election campaign." Two days later, Ambassador Dunn welcomed the 600th American relief ship to reach Italy, at which time he stressed the "great national effort made by the American people to save Italy from starvation, chaos and possible domination from outside."

During the campaign few incidents occurred. All electioneering ceased on April 16. Luigi Longo, a leader in the Communist party, said on the 18th that if his party were defeated and given no part in the government: "We will continue to act as we have been doing. We will criticize and attack the government. But we will not promote violence."

The elections were held on April 18 and 19. Every precaution had been taken by the government to avoid disturbances. It had on several occasions displayed its armed forces, in order to increase confidence in the regime. The result was a decisive victory for the Christian Democrats, who together with the right-wing Socialists, obtained a clear majority in the Chamber of Deputies and an absolute majority in the Senate. With about 94 per cent of the people voting, the Christian Democrats obtained 48.7 per cent of the total seats in the Chamber and 48.5 in the Senate. The Popular Front received 32.1 per cent of the Chamber votes and 30.5 of the Senate. In accordance with the system of proportional representation operative in Italy, the Christian Democrats held 307 seats in the Chamber and 151 in the Senate; the Popular Front 182 in the Lower and 115 in the Upper House.

Premier de Gasperi said on the 21st that the elections had proved the determination of the Italian people to remain free. He promised that the Christian Democrats would preserve this freedom. The first task of the new government, de Gasperi declared, would be to solve the problems of unemployment and agrarian reform. He advocated a foreign policy leading to "economic collaboration with peoples more powerful than ourselves, and to solidarity with all free and democratic peoples."

In his first public statement since the election, communist leader Togliatti said on the 22nd that, although the elections were not free--since the people had been coerced by foreign intervention, interference by the clergy, and intimidation by the government and employers--the Communists had "no intention of using force or violence."

3. Greece

Communist-Led Guerrilla Warfare

During April further progress was realized in the campaign to end insurrectionary activities in the northern and central sections of Greece. A guerrilla threat to Salonika ended on the 4th. United States military informants declared at that time that the Greek Third Corps, after five days of fighting, had crushed a force of 800 in the Krussia Mountain area, north of the city. The operation had been conducted according to plans formulated by a joint American-Greek military advisory group. A nine-day battle along the Greek-Albanian border ended on April 6 with the Greek Army commanding strategic positions in the area.

The Greek General Staff, in an official statement released on the 9th, estimated the number of guerrillas presently engaged in military action at 30,000 as compared with 12,000 a year earlier. Rebel casualties during the year were placed at 20,000 (including 9,800 killed, 4,500 captured, and 5,800 who had surrendered).

A campaign was launched by the Regular Army on April 15 to drive the guerrillas from east-central Greece, in the area north of the Gulf of Corinth. The Air Force and units of the Navy assisted in the operation. Strong enemy forces in the region were said to have been trapped in the mountainous area, were breaking up into small groups and taking cover in railroad tunnels and caves to escape the advance of government troops. An official communiqué of April 25 advised that Navy bombardment against a force of 2,500 guerrillas near Corinth was in progress.

In the south-central portion of the country, United States observers stated on the 19th that 30,000 Greek soldiers were slowly closing in on rebel forces located there. By the 22nd, these guerrillas were reported to be abandoning their positions around Mount Parnassus and attempting to move northward. The following day, a General Staff communiqué announced that Greek First Corps had been stationed from the Agrapha area "northward" to prevent the enemy bands from escaping. As the month closed, a "general disintegration in the rebel morale" was reported--as National Army forces, in larger numbers, took up encircling positions.

Abduction of Children

Eleven hundred children--the first to be evacuated from northern Greece to prevent their abduction by guerrilla forces--arrived in Athens on April 2 from the Alexandroupolis region of Thrace.

On the 14th, a report from one observation group of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, concerning the alleged abduction of Greek children, was made public. This team, investigating alleged abductions in Alexandroupolis from March 15 to 31, was furnished with nine lists containing the names of approximately 750 persons said to have been seized--385 of these being children under 15 years of age. Its findings, which were examined by the Special Committee on the 21st, were inconclusive--although several witnesses had said that the guerrillas had previously announced a plan for sending the children to Bulgaria for schooling.

U.N. Special Balkans Committee

During April the United Nations Special Committee dealt with complaints from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania in reference to the Greek situation.

On April 5 the Bulgarian Government charged that Greek soldiers had attacked a Bulgarian frontier post on the 4th, and captured three guards. Bulgaria demanded "that the captured ... guards be immediately released, that the assailants be punished, and all measures taken in order to avoid a repetition of such acts of violence." It asserted that, "failing this, the Bulgarian Government will find itself compelled to take all the necessary countermeasures." Greece rejected the Bulgarian charges. The U. N. Special Committee on the Balkans immediately ordered an observation group to investigate and report on the incident. On the 22nd, the Committee offered its good offices to Bulgaria "for the regulation of the incident and for the establishment of good-neighborly relations along the Greco-Bulgarian border."

The Balkans Committee received on the 9th a letter (dated March 11) from the Albanian Government to the Secretary-General of the United Nations rejecting an offer made by the Committee on February 23 to assist in the implementation of the Assembly resolution of October 21, 1947 for the restoration of normal diplomatic and good relations between Greece and the nations on its northern border. The Greek Government assured the Special Committee that it would co-operate.

Bulgaria's rejection of the February 23 offer was announced on April 20. The government declared that "the responsibility for the abnormal relations between the two countries falls exclusively upon the Athens Government, which has attempted to draw profit from the postwar situation for purposes of conquest, in attempting to annex a part of Bulgarian territory..." However, the communication continued, Bulgaria "would have no objection to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Greece if the Athens Government should give serious proof of its good will to renounce its annexionist aspirations ... and if it should take the necessary measures

with a view of putting an end to the infringements of the Bulgarian frontier and to the campaign of incitement to war maintained in Greece against the Bulgarian people... ."

A "security zone", 60 miles deep, set up along the Greek-Yugoslav border was announced by the Yugoslav Government on April 14. Asserting that there had recently been incidents in the region involving diplomats and other foreign nationals, Yugoslavia prohibited travel within the zone to all except persons possessing special passes.

On the 28th, the Secretary-General received a letter from the permanent representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations rejecting the Committee offer and saying that he was "unable to take into consideration any proposal whatever" from the Special Committee on the Balkans. The communication added: "I would like to renew to you the stand which my government took with regard to this Committee; namely, that its creation is opposed to the very letter and spirit of the Charter...; that this Committee is illegal; and that it cannot be, either from a legal or factual point of view, an organ of the United Nations."

On April 2, 12, and 20, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received additional complaints from the Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister of alleged "Greek provocations against Albania." The cablegram of the 20th brought the total number of such communications to 13. Reports from Lake Success on April 24 disclosed that the U. N. Special Committee on the Balkans, in questioning whether the incidents cited were "based on real facts," had sharply accused Albania of repudiating recommendations made by the General Assembly on October 21, 1947 dealing with threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. The Committee pointed out that: "This attitude of the Albanian Government with respect to decisions of the General Assembly ... and of its legally constituted organs is difficult to reconcile with the desire of the Albanian Government to become a member of the United Nations."

4. States in the Soviet Orbit

a) Bulgaria

Bulgarian-Czechoslovak Mutual Assistance Pact

The Bulgarian Premier, Georgi Dimitrov, and members of his cabinet arrived in Prague on April 20 to conclude a treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia. The agreement (signed on the 23rd) is of twenty-year duration--subject to automatic renewal for successive five-year periods thereafter unless notice of withdrawal one year in advance is given by either country. In accord with Czechoslovak desires, the defense clause is of a limited nature, reading:

"The high contracting parties bind themselves to undertake jointly all measure in their power to make impossible in the future the development of any threat from Germany and to prevent an attack on the part of Germany or any other state which would ally itself directly or in any other way with Germany. To this purpose the high

contracting parties will participate in a spirit of sincerest co-operation in all international action for maintaining international peace and security and will contribute fully to the realization of this goal. ...

"Should one of the high contracting parties be involved in war with Germany ... or with any other state which should directly or in any way unite with Germany in an aggressive policy, the other high contracting party would immediately offer military and other help by all means at its disposal."

It was also stipulated that the two nations would confer on "all serious international questions" which affected their interests, and would "consolidate economic, cultural and other relations." On April 24 the Bulgarian Premier paid a visit to Czechoslovak President Beneš. It was said Beneš "expressed satisfaction" over the mutual aid treaty negotiated between his country and Bulgaria.

The two governments, in a joint communiqué released on April 27, disclosed that in addition to concluding a friendship and mutual assistance pact, they had agreed to establish a permanent commission to arrange for complete economic collaboration.

b) Czechoslovakia

Plans for National Elections

On the same day (7th), the Deputy Premier and the Minister of Social Welfare, both leaders of the General Confederation of Labor, delivered addresses urging that multi-party elections scheduled for May be replaced by a single list, presented by the government. "Since we now have economy and production organized," the Minister of Social Welfare stressed, "we should suffer a breakdown if we would not create the same harmony in politics. We cannot have social economy and liberal disorder. In the West they will weep and claim that the dissolution of our democracy continues. Yes, it goes on. This is the dissolution of bourgeois democracy."

Socialist ministers and deputies of the Social Democratic party met on the 8th, and supported unanimously the plan for a single National Front slate. The following day, all parties in the National Front had approved this electoral device. Premier Gottwald called it necessary to "confirm the results of the February events in democratic, constitutional and parliamentary fashion." He added, however, that "if there are enemies of the National Front, no one will prevent them from building up their own parties to go independently into the election."

It was announced on the 13th that the election would take place on the 30th of May instead of the 23rd. A new electoral law, calling for a direct and secret ballot, a joint election list, and proportional representation was accepted by the cabinet. The measure provided for the selection of electoral boards by the local authorities from a list of nominees presented by the action committee in individual districts. The act also stipulated that persons who "sinned against the republic, the nation and the people's democratic state" be excluded from voting.

A draft constitution, as adopted by the cabinet, was published April 14 (with ratification probable by May 9). This document makes provision for a unicameral parliament to be the supreme legislative organ of the state. Civil rights and liberties--including equality before the law, equality of women with men, and individual freedom--are guaranteed. Other clauses assure freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly. The constitution also stresses the right of an individual to "education, work and just remuneration for work done and to relaxation after work." However, it asserts that citizens are obliged to "work in favor of the community and to participate in defense of the state."

Merger of Social Democrats with Communists

On April 10, the internal executive board of the Social Democratic party proposed that when the full executive board of the party met on the 17th and 18th, they take up the subject of unification with the Communist party to form a joint workers organization. On the 17th, the Executive Central Committee of the Communist and Social Democratic parties issues a joint communiqué, which read in part:

"A central merger committee will publish instructions for the preparation of the merger. The common ideological basis will be the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, which history, especially that of World War II, proved the mighty weapon of socialism. On the basis of extensive experience and also for practical reasons the organizational basis of the merger will be the Communist party of Czechoslovakia.

The announcement also revealed that the formal fusion of the two parties will take place "after the election campaign."

Security Council Action

The Security Council on April 6 continued discussions on the Chilean charge that the Soviet Union had assisted the communist minority in Czechoslovakia to gain power during the February crisis. A resolution, presented by U. S. Delegate Warren Austin, to invite the Czechoslovak Government to participate in the Council's deliberation on this issue, was approved by a 9 to 0 vote, with the Soviet Union and Ukraine abstaining.

In proposing the resolution, Austin recalled that he previously had suggested that the representative of the present Czechoslovak Government be in attendance during the consideration because of the grave nature of the proceedings. "We cannot help but wonder," he said "what causes the new Czechoslovak Government to be so reluctant about requesting an opportunity to be heard by this Council. Can it be that [it] is afraid of participating in an open debate? Is it apprehensive that its case will not stand up before world opinion following open and free debate in this Council?"

Although Vladimir Houdek, the newly appointed Czechoslovak delegate was present, the Council decided to postpone further consideration of the question until April 12 in order to give the Czechoslovak Government time to consider the invitation and appoint a representative. On the 10th,

Houdek formally declined the Council's invitation, saying that "since the discussion of internal matters of Czechoslovakia in the Security Council is contrary to the basic principles of the Charter, inspired by the aim of protecting the sovereignty and independence of states, the Czechoslovak Government does not find it possible to take part in such discussions."

When discussion was resumed on the 12th, Ambassador Hernán Santa Cruz of Chile submitted a resolution calling upon the Council to establish a subcommittee to hear testimony and examine evidence given by Czechoslovak political leaders in exile. Soviet Delegate Gromyko immediately opposed this action, saying "all such demands must be flatly rejected....The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia do not need any self-styled arbiters and will not allow anyone to deal with the question of their obligations." Gromyko denied intervention on the part of the Soviet Union in the Czechoslovak Government crisis. He also attacked the foreign policies of the United States and Great Britain, reiterating his charges of the previous month that the United States had plotted "the liquidation of the Czechoslovak Republic and the conversion of [the country] into a vassal of the United States." This, he said, was foiled by the Communists.

The United States and Great Britain, on the other hand, gave full support to the Chilean proposal. Ambassador Austin insisted that the charges of Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia must be examined, saying: "All the facts in this case are not readily apparent, but the seriousness of the charges is such that the Security Council is bound to make every effort to get at the facts."

The U. S. Ambassador told the Council that "in the charges before us we are not faced with an account of armed forces moving across the frontier from one state to another in pursuance of an aggressive purpose. ... The charges before us are that a 'threat of force' was used. The Security Council must determine whether 'threat of force' was used or some other form of pressure or illegal interference was applied." Austin pointed out also that:

"...the Czechoslovak story assumed added significance when compared with developments that have taken place throughout Eastern and Central Europe. In Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland, while details varied the general pattern was the same. Like Czechoslovakia, all these countries have been occupied by the Soviet armies. The chief steps were the acquisition by the Communists of key posts in the Cabinet; control of the police; control of the armies; control of the media of mass communications; and finally control of or subversion of the judiciary. In none of these countries did the Communists enjoy popular support sufficient to warrant their commanding position in the governments. ...

"There is a striking uniformity in techniques applied by the Communists in their fight against the majority. In all five countries they concentrated their propaganda barrage against one non-Communist party after another. The familiar pattern of accusation of conspiracy against the State and of hostility to the Soviet Union was used. ..."

However, since Chile is not a member of the Security Council and as none of the members formally introduced the Chilean proposal, no vote was taken.

On the 29th, the Council resumed discussions on the Czechoslovak case, with the Soviet delegate again denouncing the Chilean proposal. Ambassador Austin (U.S.) emphasized that under the United Nations Charter the Security Council has the right to create subsidiary organs on an entirely procedural vote, in which the veto does not apply. However, Gromyko argued that the suggestion to establish a subcommittee actually meant a proposal for an investigation—on which a vote could be taken. The meeting adjourned, with no decision having been reached.

c) Finland

Soviet-Finnish Treaty

After a week's consideration of the reply to be made to the Soviet Union on the proposed security pact, the Finnish cabinet met with President Paasikivi in closed session on April 3. An official statement revealed that the government furnished the two Finnish delegates who had come from Moscow with instructions that would enable the continuance of negotiations with Soviet authorities. It was "reliably" stated on the 4th that the new instructions were in response to a Soviet concession dispensing with immediate military staff consultations in accordance with Finnish opposition to such action in peacetime. Concurrently, communist sources continued their campaign against the Finnish parliamentary majority that opposed the military clauses in the projected pact.

The Soviet and Finnish negotiators quickly reached an agreement on the terms of the mutual assistance treaty, which was signed on April 6 by Foreign Minister Molotov for the Soviet Union and by Prime Minister Pekkala for Finland. The treaty is to remain in force for 10 years, in contrast to other military assistance pacts between the Soviet Union and Eastern European and Balkan countries that are of twenty-year duration. The preamble takes note of Finland's "aspiration to stand aside from the contradictions of interests of the Great Powers." Articles I and II which relate to the military provisions of the pact follow:

"In the event of Finland or the Soviet Union, across the territory of Finland, becoming the object of military aggression on the part of Germany or any State allied to the latter, Finland, loyal to her duty as an independent State, will fight to repulse the aggression. In doing so, Finland will direct all the forces at her disposal to the defense of the inviolability of her territory on land, on sea and in the air, acting within her boundaries ... with the assistance, in case of need, of the Soviet Union or jointly with the latter.

"In the cases indicated above, the Soviet Union will render Finland the necessary assistance, in regard to the granting of which the parties will agree between themselves. [Article I].

"The high contracting parties will consult each other in the event of a threat of military attack envisaged in Article I being ascertained. [Article II]."

Speaking at the signing ceremony, Molotov stated that the agreement reached was based on the draft presented by the Finnish delegation.

He added: "The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that the present treaty will contribute to broad and amicable co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and Finland, and that the signing of this treaty will be received with gratification not only by the peoples of our States but by all friends of peace and progress." Prime Minister Pekkala of Finland in turn declared: "An important Treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland has been signed by us today. After the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, such [a treaty] is a significant act for both countries. In it is manifested the great achievement of that foreign policy, which is founded on the postwar friendship between the Soviet Union and Finland."

Premier Stalin, at a dinner in honor of the Finnish delegation on the 7th, said that "for 150 years, there existed a mutual distrust in the relations between Russia and Finland." Stalin continued: "What is needed is that the treaty we have signed should dissipate that distrust and create a new basis for relations between our peoples, and that it should mark a major turn in relations between the two countries, toward trust and friendship." He warned that distrust between countries could not be eliminated "all at once," and that it would require a long period of time and effort to remove these "vestiges ... so as to create traditions of mutual friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Finland and make them enduring."

The Premier went on to say that the present treaty was based on equality between the two signatories because the Soviet Union believes that every country "has its qualitative distinctions, its specific features, which belong only to it and which no other nations possess." In conclusion, Stalin said:

"You will not find many political leaders of great powers who regard small nations as the equals of large nations. Most of them look down upon small nations. They are willing, on occasion, to offer small nations unilateral guarantees. But, generally speaking, these leaders do not care to conclude equal treaties with small nations, as they do not regard small nations as their partners."

The Soviet newspaper Pravda on the 8th reiterated the words of Molotov and Stalin and stressed that:

"The Soviet-Finnish treaty is convincing proof of the consistency of the Soviet Union in carrying out its foreign policy based on respect for the state sovereignty of other countries. The treaty again shows the desire of the Soviet Union to establish friendly relations with its neighbors—relations built on the basis of the sovereign equality of the contracting parties."

Speaking on April 9, President Paasikivi of Finland asserted that the treaty did not follow the pattern of Soviet pacts signed with other Eastern European states. This, he said, is "determined by Finland's geographical position and her other peculiarities." The President gave assurances that there were no secret clauses in the agreement and that the pact offered protection to Finland from attacks by other major powers. Paasikivi added:

"It must immediately and with satisfaction be stated that the Soviet Union during the negotiations has displayed an understanding for Finland's point of view and her will of making a treaty which could be acceptable even from the Finnish point of view. The important principle that Finland's ambition is to remain outside of controversies of interests among the great powers has openly been expressed."

Reiterating his promise of a month earlier, Paasikivi declared that elections would take place in July as scheduled. He warned that a communist coup would meet with defeat if attempted, and added: "I am sure the people of Finland can safeguard their valued parliamentary and democratic political regime."

The Finnish Parliament on April 28 ratified the Finnish-Soviet mutual assistance pact by a vote of 157 to 11.

d) Rumania

New Regime

The newly elected Great National Assembly met for the first time on April 6. The session was opened with a statement by the Rumanian President, who stressed that the Assembly must consolidate the country to fight "imperialism and defend the country's independence and peace. For this," he added, "we have our allies and especially great and invincible Soviet Russia beside us." The following day, the communist chairman of the General Confederation of Labor was elected president of the Assembly.

Premier Petru Groza introduced the draft of the proposed Constitution to the Assembly on the 8th. Consideration of its 105 Articles began on the 12th. Three principal bodies are set up under the new Constitution: a Grand National Assembly, which is the supreme authority; a Presidium of 19 members (elected by the Assembly)--including a president, two vice-presidents, and a secretary; and a Cabinet Council. The Constitution was unanimously adopted on the 13th.

During the Assembly meeting of the 13th, Groza, as a formality following the elections, presented his resignation and that of his cabinet. He was immediately re-elected Premier.

A government decree was passed on the 22nd, introducing a new system in the courts which provides that the general prosecutor will supervise the "prosecution and punishment of those who commit crimes against the democratic order and liberties, against the economic interests, the national independence and sovereignty of the Rumanian State."

e) Yugoslavia

Political Trials

Before a military tribunal in Ljubljana on April 20, fifteen leading Yugoslav officials and Communist party members went on trial,

charged with espionage, sabotage, and with "endangering the independence and integrity of Yugoslavia, with the aim of overthrowing the regime." On the 26th, after a rapid succession of "confessions," the tribunal reached a verdict whereby three former high government officials and eight other defendants were sentenced to death, while the four remaining received sentences of 15 to 20 years at hard labor. Government authorities denied that the trial was along the lines of the Soviet Communist party purge trials of the 1930's, declaring that they had documentaty evidence that the defendants were traitors.

Military Appropriations

The Yugoslav Federal Parliament convened on April 22 to consider the annual budget. The following day the government submitted estimates for 1948 increasing military appropriations by \$60 million over the previous year. The defense estimate for equipment and personnel was placed at \$330 million. Speaking at the joint session of the Parliament on the 24th, the Deputy Minister of National Defense declared that the abnormal international situation demanded an increase in military appropriations.

The Minister stressed, however, that the added funds were required to secure the Yugoslav frontiers, and would not threaten any other nation's independence. He pointed out that the appropriation was only 13 per cent of the total budget, as compared to much larger percentages in other countries.

5. Iran

Soviet Charges Against Activities of U.S. and Iranian Governments

A further exchange of notes between Iran and the Soviet Union during April served to maintain tension existing between the two countries. An Iranian note of the 1st rejected a protest, contained in a Soviet communication of March 27, against activities of United States military advisers in Iran. The Iranian Government further added that it was "free to make any decision that will benefit the country or improve its organizations. Any effort to influence these decisions is interference in its internal affairs. ..."

The note directed attention to the Soviet Union's failure to remove its troops from Iran at the close of the war within the time agreed upon, its interference in the province of Azerbaijan, the harboring (by the Soviet Government) of subversive Iranian nationals, and the existence--despite Soviet denials--of a radio station in Soviet territory which was broadcasting attacks upon Iran.

An official Soviet statement published in Pravda and Izvestia on April 4 accused the Iranian Government of attempting to evade responsibility for policies which violated good-neighborly relations. The statement compared present conditions in Iran with those existing in 1941 (when reported activities of Nazi agents led to the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran). On the same day, the Soviet Union was said to be dismantling port installations in a concession area granted by Iran and discontinuing shipping services.

A Soviet note delivered on the 7th rejected a protest made by Iran during March against a Moscow broadcast attacking the Iranian Government and United States missions in the country. The note also made reference to "the belligerently libelous propaganda launched by a great number of Teheran newspapers against the Soviet Union."

6. China

National Assembly Action

The National Assembly began regular sessions on April 6. Delegates demanded that the Assembly have rights (which under the Constitution are reserved to the Legislative Yuan) to hear administrative reports and to initiate legislation. They proposed also that the Assembly meet every two years instead of every six years.

On the 8th a majority of the delegates voted to empower the present Assembly to "hear administrative reports, discuss national problems, and recommend measures to the government," but a committee on constitutional amendments later defeated a proposal to make these measures permanent.

President Chiang Kai-shek addressed the Assembly on the 9th, reviewing the economic and military situation. He stated that China's economy was not in danger of collapse, and stressed that the greatest threat was not from the Communists, but from within. Criticizing the failure of the people to observe the austerity program, he added: "If that situation is continued, our reserves will be worthless, regardless of their size." He further observed: "I hope that none will neglect the fact that the government is carrying out the biggest military operation in our history." He believed that military mistakes of the past had been due primarily to the government's concern for the welfare of the people, resulting in too wide a dispersion of forces. Pointing out that it was impossible for the government to guard all areas against the Communists, he indicated that different tactics would be employed.

In his report to the Assembly on the 14th, Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh listed as concrete evidence of violations of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 the continued presence of Soviet troops in Dairen, and the establishment, by revolting Turki peoples in Sinkiang, of an "East Turkestan Republic." He further noted the general communist problem in China, and an increase of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia.

Two days later the Foreign Affairs Committee approved, and on the 21st the Assembly adopted, a resolution asking the government to urge the Soviet Union to observe the treaty, and to restore machinery taken from Manchuria during Soviet occupation. The resolution further recommended an appeal to the United Nations in the event of Soviet "procrastination," and the taking of unilateral "effective measures" if necessary. Charging that the Soviet Union was using the Sino-Soviet Aviation Corporation as a means of obtaining military information in Sinkiang, and for the transportation of secret agents, the Assembly called upon the government to abrogate the Sino-Soviet Aviation Agreement in Sinkiang.

On the 15th, following the reading of reports by cabinet ministers over a number of days, the Assembly turned to a consideration of six proposals for possible constitutional amendments. The most important one, sponsored by 1,200 delegates, provided for emergency powers to be given the President in times of national crisis. On the 18th the Assembly gave its approval to a measure, which provided that during the period of national crisis, the President might "by a resolution of the Executive Yuan take emergency measures to avert imminent danger to the security of the state or of the people or to cope with any serious financial or economic change," without being subject to constitutional restrictions in that respect. The President "on his own initiative or at the request of the Legislative Yuan" could declare termination of the crisis.

The proposal further provided that an extraordinary session of the present Assembly should be called "not later than December 25, 1950 to discuss all proposals pertaining to amendments to the Constitution," and that the Assembly would decide then--if the period of crisis had not been terminated--whether or not these temporary provisions should be continued in force or abrogated.

On the 21st, the Assembly further approved a Foreign Affairs Committee resolution proposing that China call an East Asia conference to work out plans to "combat communist penetration" and promote economic co-operation. Participants suggested were India, Burma, Siam, the Philippines, and possible Australia and New Zealand. A resolution charging the United States with attempting to "revive Japanese militarism" was also passed on the 21st. It advocated the establishment of a fifty-year joint Allied control of Japan, the participation, with veto power, by the four major powers in the drafting of a Japanese treaty, return of the Ryukyus to China, and the assignment of 50 per cent of Japanese reparations to China.

Progress of Civil War

Fighting in China continued throughout April, with Nationalist forces recapturing points in central and eastern Honan province, and re-taking munitions manufacturing and distribution centers in central Hopei province. On the 7th, a Chinese Government military spokesman explained that operations in central China would get priority over "the question of Manchuria." He asserted that the Yellow River was now the government's main line of defense. Communist gains included seizure of Loyang (for the second time within three weeks), the recapture of Yen-an, their former capital, and the taking of Weihsein, after a siege of more than a month. The fall of this city to the Communists on the 27th gave them virtual control of central and eastern Shantung, and at the end of the month they were driving toward Tsingtao on the Shantung Peninsula, where U. S. naval forces have a base.

Election of President and Vice-President

Despite his announcement on April 4 that he would not be a candidate, Chiang Kai-shek was nominated for the presidency by the Assembly on the 16th, and elected on the 19th by 2,430 votes. However, a real contest developed in the choice of a vice-president. In the final result, on the

29th, General Li Tsung-jen, a reform candidate, was elected, defeating Dr. Sun Fo, the Kuomintang right-wing choice (who had been favored by Chiang) by 1,438 votes to 1,295. Throughout the campaign, General Li had stressed land reform and the elimination of incompetent and corrupt officials both in the government and in the Kuomintang.

7. India - Pakistan

Relations with Hyderabad

Sir Walter Monckton, constitutional adviser to the Nizam of Hyderabad, met with Governor-General Lord Mountbatten and Prime Minister Nehru in Delhi on April 7 in an effort to prevent a breakdown of relations between India and Hyderabad State.

The Indian Government had sent a note during March protesting alleged nonfulfillment by Hyderabad of the "standstill agreement" signed in November 1947. A note in reply was handed the Indian Government, counter- ing with charges of defaults by India. The note further suggested that differences between the two governments be referred to arbitration by an impartial tribunal, as provided for in the agreement. Sir Walter returned to Hyderabad on April 9 with "certain verbal assurances" from spokesmen of the Indian Government. No decision as to resuming negotiations was reached-- pending his report to the Nizam's government.

On the same day (9th), 25,000 uniformed Razakars (volunteers of the Hyderabad Moslem organization Majlis Ittehad) staged an orderly demonstration in Hyderabad and Secunderabad. They listened to their leader's exhortation to observe discipline for the protection and maintenance of Hyderabad's independence. Syed Kazim Razvi, Moslem leader, also stated that "for 200 years Hyderabad has enjoyed a type of government which has proved successful. Any form of government which would jeopardize the sovereignty of the Nizam is unthinkable."

Charter for Protection of Minorities

A charter for the protection of Hindu and Moslem minorities within Pakistan and India respectively was signed in Calcutta on April 19 by representatives of the two Dominions. The agreement places with each Dominion responsibility for protection of minorities within its area; guarantees equal rights, privileges, and obligations to all citizens, and attempts to discourage irridentist propaganda by seeking co-operation from the press. The document was drawn up primarily to solve minority problems in East and West Bengal. Plans for a conference to extend the charter's provisions to other provinces of both Dominions were discussed.

Security Council Action

Security Council consideration of the Indian-Pakistani question, scheduled for late March, was postponed indefinitely. However, at the Council meeting on April 1, Dr. Alfonso Lopez of Colombia (new president of the Council) announced that the series of informal discussions with Indian and Pakistani representatives would be continued in an attempt to reach a decision on the Chinese draft resolution, providing for the "restoration of peace and order."

When no agreement seemed likely, the delegation chiefs of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, China, and Colombia met and drew up a new resolution. This was submitted to the Security Council on the 17th, with the approval of France. It stated that:

"... the membership of the Commission established by the Resolution of the Council of January 20th, 1948 shall be increased to five ..., and instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian sub-continent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission... ."

It also recommended "to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which, in the opinion of the Council, are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan."

"The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavors: To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purposes of fighting and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State; to make known to all concerned that the measures ... provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.

"The Government of India should: When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission ... that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order, make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage; when the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength ... arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles:

"That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the state; that as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas; that any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present Base area...."

Concerning the plebiscite, the resolution stated:

"The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the Ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a Plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police. ..."

Provisions made for the appointment and functions of the Administrator, as contained in the resolution, follow:

"The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his Assistants and other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the Plebiscite. ... The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrate within the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite.

"The Administrator should have the right to communicate direct with the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their Representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing ... any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the Plebiscite. ..."

Another clause of the resolution recommended the determination by the Commission of the Security Council at the conclusion of the plebiscite as to whether or not it has been "really free and impartial."

At the next Security Council meeting on the 19th, the delegates of India and Pakistan presented objections to the resolution. The Indian delegate stated that, whereas his government had found the Chinese resolution "acceptable in substance," the new six-nation draft had so amended and distorted the earlier one, and the whole approach had been so changed that "it is now impossible for us to agree to it." The Foreign Minister of Pakistan pointed out that although both parties had agreed on a "free and impartial plebiscite" in Kashmir, his government could not be expected to agree that the new resolution would insure that end.

It was suggested that the Council adjourn in order to study the texts of the statements. Dr. Jose Arce of Argentina made a formal proposal to the effect that general debate be closed, and that the Council consider

the draft resolution paragraph by paragraph. When the Council met on the 21st, it proceeded in the manner proposed. Each of the 30 paragraphs was considered and voted on separately. The resolution was adopted, with eight nations voting affirmatively on every provision. The Ukraine and the Soviet Union abstained throughout.

The Council on April 23 nominated Belgium and Colombia to serve on the five-member commission to supervise the plebiscite in Kashmir.

B. TREATMENT OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING PEOPLES

1. Indonesia

Good Offices Committee

The various committees of the Netherlands-Indonesian Conference continued their functions under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices during April. Agreement was reached on a number of economic and financial questions, including the "principle of unity in matters of currency, trade, foreign exchange, customs areas, customs control and economic policy with respect to the acquisition of imported goods and price control."

The United Nations announced on April 15 the appointment of a public relations officer for the Committee of Good Offices. This step was taken as a result of protests of the foreign correspondents' committee at Batavia against the public relations policy of the Committee.

In accordance with the decision to carry out political discussions alternately at Batavia and Jogjakarta, members of the Committee of Good Offices and the delegations left Batavia on April 12 for the Republican capital. During street demonstrations on the arrival of the Netherlands and the Republic delegates at Jogjakarta, members of the Netherlands group were said to have been insulted. The Netherlands East Indies Government immediately issued a statement which declared that, "as soon as information has been received from the delegation, definite decisions on the consequences of these incidents will be published. The Netherlands East Indies Government explicitly declares that it holds the Republican authorities responsible for the safety of the Netherlands delegation and their property." However, the statement was made on the 19th that "the United Nations Committee of Good Offices on Indonesia is of the opinion that there was great exaggeration in certain press reports of incidents which took place upon the arrival at Jogjakarta on 12 April of the train carrying members and staff of the Committee and the Netherlands and Republican delegations."

Netherlands Indies financial and economic experts pointed out that the "rioting" at Jogjakarta reflected "unsound conditions" in the Republic, which would not be conducive to economic security for Europeans, and which would not assure adequate production and export of commodities so urgently needed by the world. They insisted that "the Republican Government has no authority and no experience and will continue to be ruled by terrorist and communist activities."

In Amsterdam on the 18th, the Netherlands Government said that "the transfer of government authority to the future government of the United

States of Indonesia is only effectible if sufficient guarantee is given that it will take over all the obligations of the present Dutch Indies Government and that it will warrant their fulfillment by a sound monetary and financial policy."

At its fifth meeting on April 20, the Political Committee of the Netherlands-Indonesian Conference established three new subcommittees--the first to deal with problems of Federation and Union, co-operation during the interim period, and the establishment of a provisional federal government; the second to consider problems of defense and security within the United States of Indonesia and co-operation for defense within the Netherlands-Indonesian Union; and the third to study provisions for a plebiscite in Java, Sumatra, and Madura to determine the relations of these territories to the United States of Indonesia, and methods for convening a constituent assembly.

Dr. L. N. Palar and Dr. Tjoa Sik Ien, who represented Indonesia during Security Council consideration of the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute, started presentation of informal appeals to Council members on April 29 for investigation of Republican charges that the Netherlands Government was "sabotaging" the truce agreement of January 17.

2. Palestine

U.N. Palestine Commission

The question of the future of the Palestine Commission, which was discussed by the Security Council on the first of the month, led the Commission to adopt a resolution on April 2 that it would "continue its work, bearing in mind the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, in the understanding that all of its decisions will be subject to such final action on the future Government of Palestine as may be taken by the Special Session of the General Assembly... ."

At the same meeting, the Commission resolved to undertake the preparation of a report for presentation to the Special Session which would "include an exposition of the reasons which have prevented the Commission from discharging all of the responsibilities assigned to it by the resolution of November 29, 1947." On April 5, the draft outline for the special report was approved by Commission members.

Two days later, the group decided to send to the Security Council a special report on the food situation in Palestine after the termination of the British mandate on May 15. Also on the 7th, the Palestine Commission received word from the Jewish Agency regarding the urgency of the food situation in Jerusalem. It was stressed that "100,000 Jews in the Holy City are threatened with starvation as a result of the indifference of the Mandatory Government to the depredations of armed Arab gangs."

In the name of the Palestine Commission, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche (principal secretary of the Commission) addressed a letter on April 9 to the British delegation, advising that they had "decided for the time being to defer action on the proposal that it [the Commission] proceed to London for the purpose of carrying on negotiations with His Majesty's Government

there." Dr. Bunche pointed out that the Mandatory Power had recognized the Commission as the "successor authority" in the Holy Land, and he said the Commission was of the opinion that its "legal status and its duties remain substantially unaltered until changed by action of the General Assembly." Inasmuch as only a short time remained until May 15, and as it appeared unlikely that the Assembly would make "advance arrangements" in regard to the matters outlined in the letter--coupled with the belief that the Mandatory Power would not abandon Palestine "to complete chaos after May 15"--the British representative was advised that the Commission "is prepared to hold itself at the disposal of the Mandatory Power to discuss the necessary arrangements that should be made immediately... ."

The Commission's report to the Special Session of the Assembly, made public on April 13, concluded that, in view of the "steadily deteriorating situation in Palestine," the termination of the mandate would be followed by "administrative chaos, starvation, widespread strife, violence, and bloodshed." Reviewing the difficulties which had confronted the Commission, the study disclosed that:

"The general policy of the Mandatory Power has been not to take any measure which might be construed as involving it in the implementation of the Assembly's resolution. It did not accept the provision of the resolution calling for a progressive transfer of authority to the Commission; insisted on retaining undivided control of Palestine until the termination of the Mandate; and informed the Commission that it 'would not regard favorably' the arrival of the Commission in Palestine earlier than a fortnight before the date of termination of the Mandate. More important still, Arab elements, both inside and outside of Palestine, have exerted organized, intensive effort toward defeating the purposes of the resolution"

The charges made against Great Britain were denied on the 14th by a spokesman, who said in part: "The Commission could have sent as much as it liked and as early as it liked in the way of administrative personnel which is what was needed to prevent a breakdown of public services. The arrival of the Commission's chiefs was not desired until May 1 in order to prevent the additional dislocation involved in the duplication of authority."

A unanimous decision was reached by the Palestine Commission on the 14th to proceed at once with steps leading toward the formation of an emergency police force for Jerusalem--to carry out special security functions after the termination of the mandate. The Commission had been told that some 200 to 250 British members of the Palestine police would be willing to volunteer for duty after May 15, and it was decided to offer these men contracts for the period from May 16 to July 1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations agreed to authorize the use of a sum up to \$200,000 from the organization's working capital fund to defray the costs of this activity. However, on the 19th the British delegation to the United Nations said these volunteers had been reduced to 50 "young and inexperienced" men.

The Commission unanimously agreed on the 19th to delay any action on the selection of a Provisional Council of Government for the Jewish State pending a clarification of the situation by the special General Assembly session.

Security Council Action

The Security Council met on April 1 to consider the two resolutions on Palestine submitted by the United States on March 30—one asking for a truce between the Arabs and Jews, and the other requesting the Secretary-General to convoke a special session of the General Assembly "to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine."

In the course of discussion, the head of the political department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine presented the Agency's views on the two draft resolution. The truce was held to be "misleading" and it was advocated that it be amended to "conform to reality." He stated that temporary trusteeship would only aggravate the troubled situation in the Holy Land, and asked the question as to whether it was proper for the Security Council, "having received conclusive evidence of aggression actually committed," to have taken no steps to suppress, condemn, or even record that aggression. "Is it a just interpretation," the Jewish Agency representative contined, "of the Security Council's function in this question that it should obey the demand of the aggressor at pistol point, and advocate a revision of a General Assembly resolution for no other reason than that the resolution is assailed by armed force?" If this method were pursued, he held, "the consequences for world peace must be grave."

Sir Alexander Cadogan (Great Britain) spoke in favor of "all possible measures" to stop violence in Palestine, and therefore gave support to the resolutions. He made it clear, however, that his government intended to "adhere firmly" to the original dates for the termination of the mandate (May 15) and the evacuation of British troops (August 1) from the land.

The Syrian delegate (Faris el-Khourri) voiced support of the proposal for a special session in order to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to undo its original "blunder" in adopting partition. Pointing out that the Jewish Agency had declared it would "never agree to any truce if it impeded or interfered with the timetable of the implementation of the partition plan," el-Khourri said the Arab view was "just the contrary" as they hold "'we will agree to a truce if it is not used as a screen to shield the activities for the continuation of the implementation of the partition plan.'" The Arabs have never tried to keep it secret that they oppose the partition plan, and they will never agree to it."

After declaring that the only objective of the United States truce resolution was to save human lives, U. S. Delegate Warren Austin commented that no "effective cessation of the military aspect of the matter" could be arrived at without an agreement as to truce terms. For this reason, Austin said, the resolution called upon the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee to meet at the Council table to arrange such a truce.

Following these expressions of viewpoints, the Security Council proceeded to vote on the two measures. The resolution on the truce agreement was adopted unanimously after the U. S. delegate had accepted an amendment proposed by the Ukrainian delegate which deleted the words "with grave concern" from the second paragraph of the proposal. Mr. el-Khourri

stated he had voted in favor of the truce on the understanding that it would be a "standstill" on all political as well as military action, and that it "went without saying" that this included a "halt in the work of the Palestine Commission." However, the Security Council held that it had no authority to instruct the Commission to suspend its work. Nevertheless, it was felt that "common sense" would indicate to the Commission "not to undertake anything that would be possibly repudiated by the Assembly in two weeks."

The resolution calling for a special session of the General Assembly was adopted 9 to 0, with the Ukraine and the Soviet Union abstaining. The president of the Council announced that the Secretary-General was convoking the session for Friday, April 16.

Methods by which the Security Council (as stipulated in the resolution) should arrange a truce with members of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and of the Arab Higher Committee were left open, although the Canadian delegate made the suggestion that the necessary negotiations be left to the Council president. On the matter of the "future Government of Palestine," Mr. Austin invited all Security Council members to an informal discussion on April 5 of the United States proposals for a temporary United Nations trusteeship.

At the informal gathering of Security Council members (the Ukrainian and Soviet delegates did not attend) on the 5th, Ambassador Austin outlined draft suggestions for the temporary trusteeship—to be terminated as soon as the "future government" could be set up. "American officials" were said to declare that the United Nations itself would be designated as administering authority; that the government would be headed by a governor general and would include a cabinet and democratically elected legislature; that authority would be granted to permit the recruitment of inhabitants to maintain peace; that should these forces prove inadequate, the governor general could "call upon certain countries to be specified in separate protocol to supply armed forces of required strength"; and that the trusteeship government would be empowered to take over governmental agencies presently maintained by Great Britain—after its withdrawal on May 15.

A further closed meeting among Security Council members (with the Ukrainian representative in attendance) was held on the 7th. It was said that the greater part of the discussion concerned arrangements for a truce in Palestine. A statement issued by the French delegation indicated that unless some accord were reached prior to May 15 it was "only too probable that the actual fighting would become more violent and even degenerate into massacres, the responsibility for which the United Nations could not elude."

Truce Efforts

Under United Nations auspices, representatives of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab Higher Committee met with the Security Council president on April 7 in an effort to negotiate truce arrangements. Two days earlier the Jewish Agency had announced acceptance of the Council's proposal

for a truce, provided "outside Arabs" withdraw from Palestine, and that cease-fire orders would entail no political surrender or other long-term concessions.

However, virtual failure of this attempt at direct negotiation of a truce was conceded after further talks on the 8th. The Council president said that "the prospect is not as favorable as I anticipated," while the Jewish representative said, "I don't think there is any bridge." The Arab position was that the Jewish Agency represented the Jews of the world and was therefore "not competent to speak for the Jews of Palestine." Nevertheless, Security Council members continued efforts, in private meetings which the Soviet delegate did not attend, toward finding a truce formula without the co-operation of the Arab and Jewish representatives.

In an informal gathering on April 14, a majority of the Security Council members reached general agreement on a tentative draft resolution drawn up by the Council president. The resolution called upon "all persons and organizations in Palestine," and especially upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, to "cease all activities of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage"; to refrain from assisting or encouraging "armed bands and individuals"; to refrain for the time from political activity "which might prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of either community"; and to co-operate with the mandatory authority in matters affecting law and order, transportation, communications, and health and food problems.

The proposal then requested "the United Kingdom Government for so long as it remains the mandatory power to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth ... and, subject to retaining the freedom of action of its own forces, to supervise the execution of these measures" It also called upon "all governments, and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine, to ... assist in the implementation of the measures set out...."

The Security Council resumed formal meetings on the 15th, but was unable to reach agreement on the proposed resolution. The Council president, in presenting the draft, said the truce proposal had as its purpose "to make certain that the General Assembly would be free to deliberate without any untoward pressure of anarchy or adverse circumstances in Palestine, but with all the necessary time to reach a satisfactory conclusion."

Canada declared full support for the measure, and Ambassador Austin, speaking for the United States, thanked the president for the "intelligent, vigorous leadership" he had exercised. In support of the resolution, Austin said that its main objective was "tranquillity in a country that is torn by violence." Stressing that the Security Council could use armed force in Palestine only if world peace was threatened, he pointed out that the truce request relied on the "moral condemnation" of the world rather than on the application of law or force by the United Nations.

The Jewish Agency's reaction to the proposed truce was given to the Security Council by the head of the political department, who said the proposal "appeared to load the dice very heavily against Jewish interests." He expressed objection to every item of the draft resolution and proposed

amended wordings to make it acceptable to the Jewish Agency. He urged the deletion of the whole paragraph calling for abstention from "any political activity," and declared that "there can be no question of our pledging general co-operation to the British administration of Palestine which has so manifestly disregarded and even acted contrary to its most basic responsibilities." He concluded with a statement that "foreign invasion is the crux of the whole difficulty," that Arab plans were in preparation for invasion of every part of Palestine immediately after the termination of the mandate, and that the Security Council's "most urgent duty" was "to face this issue squarely."

All the changes suggested by the Jewish representative were opposed by Faris el-Khoury of Syria, who said that if the Jews insisted on the conditions outlined, perhaps it was "useless" to go on with the discussion. He said he did not disapprove, in principle, to the terms of the draft proposal, but there must be a complete standstill on political activity which might prejudice the rights or positions of the people of Palestine. He declared that the few Arabs who had recently infiltrated into the country did not constitute a "foreign invasion," but that the Zionist program was the real invader.

A suggestion that the Council proceed to a vote on the resolution was objected to by the Ukrainian and Soviet delegates, who wished time for careful consideration. Before the Council adjourned, the president offered a new draft proposal covering the composition of the special commission to supervise the truce. The new draft suggested that the commission be made up of three members of the Secretariat to be appointed by the Secretary-General. Mr. el-Khoury objected, stating he preferred the wording of the draft submitted the day before.

The Security Council met again the next evening (16th), following the opening of the General Assembly special session, and discussed the amendments proposed by the Jewish representative. Several of these proposals were supported by Soviet Delegate Gromyko, who declared that the draft resolution was "inequitable and unjust." Ambassador Austin (U.S.) accepted two of the Jewish proposals but opposed two favored by Gromyko, one of which called for the "immediate withdrawal of all armed groups which have invaded Palestine from the outside," while the other demanded the "prevention of the invasion of such groups into Palestine in the future." The Council voted against acceptance of this pair of amendments, but gave approval to the two sponsored by the United States. These concerned restraint to be exercised in giving any assistance to "armed bands," and the question of the safety of the holy places in Palestine.

The proposal for a supervisory commission to observe the keeping of the truce was dropped by the Council, against the protest of the Jewish representative who warned that the Jewish Agency thought a truce could not be carried out effectively if Great Britain were designated to supervise it.

In the early morning hours of April 17 the Security Council voted (9 to 0, with the Soviet Union and the Ukraine abstaining) to adopt the resolution as amended by the United States.

Special Session of the General Assembly

The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly, convened by the Security Council to give further consideration to the question of the future government of Palestine, opened on April 16. Ambassador Joao Carlos Muniz of Brazil served as acting president of the Assembly pending the appointment of Dr. Jose Arce (Argentina) as president. Dr. T. F. Tsiang (China) was named chairman of the First Committee (Political and Security) which handled most of the work of the session during the month. Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand) was elected chairman of the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship).

At a brief plenary meeting on the 19th (at which time the Assembly received the Union of Burma--the 58th state--into United Nations membership), the special session referred the Palestine issue to its Political Committee which was scheduled to meet on April 20. The full text of a United States draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine, based upon a draft statute for Jerusalem prepared by the Trusteeship Council and upon a number of general principles put forward by the United States for discussion at the informal meeting of Security Council members on April 5, was presented on the 20th to Committee I as a working paper "designed to facilitate discussion" of a temporary trusteeship for the Holy Land. It was specified that this document, containing 47 Articles, was not to be regarded as a "formal United States proposal."

In discussing the working paper (draft Trusteeship Agreement) in the Political Committee, U. S. Delegate Austin explained that "we and many other members of this Assembly hoped that the expression of general world opinion would influence the Arabs to give the recommendation of the Assembly a chance to work, that the United Kingdom would co-operate fully in carrying out those parts of the plan which it alone could carry out since it was in Palestine as the mandatory power, and that the Jews would make every possible effort to compose their differences with the Arabs in an effort to reduce the violence which prevailed in Palestine. Events have not fulfilled these hopes. ..." After tracing developments following the passage of the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, Austin continued:

"It seems to us clear that the primary responsibility for reaching a peaceful settlement of this problem rests upon the people of Palestine. Instead of serious and responsible efforts to resolve their differences, we see bitter retaliatory fighting and an apparent determination to seek a solution by force of arms rather than by force of reason, adjustment and persuasion. We do not believe that the peoples of Palestine are entitled to appear before the United Nations to assert demands which must be accepted by the other party and the world community as the only alternative to war."

On the terms for a temporary trusteeship, the U. S. Ambassador suggested that the agreement "should be subject to prompt termination whenever there is general agreement upon a permanent solution ...; that while supervision of the agreement should be exercised by the Trusteeship Council on behalf of the United Nations, the major governmental functions should be exercised by a government of Palestine ...; [that] such a government should be headed by a governor-general appointed by and responsible

to the Trusteeship Council; [that it] should preferably include a democratic elected legislature, possibly of two chambers, but if such a body could not be promptly established, the governor-general should be authorized to legislate by order. ..."

Austin also stressed necessity for the maintenance of law and order, as well as "specific provision" for "immigration into Palestine on some agreed basis and for a policy of land purchase." As stated on previous occasions, the speaker reiterated: "While the United States is prepared to carry its fair share of the United Nations burden involved in such a temporary trusteeship, it is not prepared to act alone in this matter. Our participation will be conditioned upon a readiness of other governments to provide similar assistance."

Continuing general debate in Committee I on the afternoon of the 20th, Soviet Delegate Gromyko termed the United States proposals as being "unacceptable," and said he would vote against them. He restated charges made late in March that "certain influential circles in the United States ... are attempting to make Palestine their military and strategic base, and in the economic field to make Palestine a semi-colony of the United States."

On the 21st, Faris el-Khoury of Syria urged careful study of the United States proposal. While expressing qualified support of the plan, he declared that the administering authority for trusteeship over Palestine should be two or three states rather than the whole of the United Nations--as making 58 member states trustees would be "absurd."

A British spokesman at Lake Success (21st) reiterated his country's determination to relinquish all civil authority in the Holy Land by May 15, and to have all troops removed by August 1. Further, a "reliable source" indicated Britain would not agree to join in any plan to send troops to Palestine to "help apply" trusteeship.

The French representative introduced a draft resolution on the morning of the 22nd to the First Committee which, "considering that the maintenance of order and security in Jerusalem is an urgent question which concerns the United Nations as a whole," recommended that the General Assembly "ask the Trusteeship Council to study and, in consultation with the Mandatory Power and the interested parties, take suitable measures for the protection of the City and its inhabitants." The chairman, however, ruled that no resolutions would be put to a vote before the conclusion of general debate--but said that when all resolutions were considered he would inquire whether the Committee wished to give priority to the French proposal.

At this same meeting, the Australian delegation distributed a draft resolution recommending the General Assembly to request the Palestine Commission to "proceed immediately with the creation of Provisional Councils of Government, Civil Administration in the relevant area or areas of Palestine; [and] to carry through ... the remaining stages after 15 May prescribed in the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947."

The resolution further called on states of the Arab League to "prohibit their Nationals from engaging in activities designed to obstruct"

the carrying out of this resolution, and called on "States Members of the United Nations to refrain from furnishing aid or encouragement to either community in Palestine ... acting without the sanction of the Palestine Commission and in obstruction of the terms" of the November 29 resolution.

Continuing general debate on the 22nd, speakers included representatives of Brazil, Yugoslavia, the Ukraine, Yemen, the Jewish Agency, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Argentina. On the same day, the Palestine Bill—providing for the ending of British jurisdiction at the termination of the mandate—was read for the third time and passed by the British House of Lords "without discussion." Having already been passed by the House of Commons, only the King's formal assent was needed for the measure to become law.

One meeting of the Political Committee was held on the 23rd, during the course of which opinions were voiced by the British Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, and Canadian, Indian, Siamese, and Lebanese representatives. Canada, India, and Siam gave support to the United States trusteeship proposal pending final solution of the political problem. Lebanon concurred, but emphasized that trusteeship should not lead to partition. The Soviet Union took occasion to again repeat its opposition. Creech-Jones warned that an early truce "must be obtained" to prevent the Holy Land from becoming "an arena of open warfare." He said that after the achievement of a truce, then all alternative solutions (including the U. S. plan) for the Palestine problem could be considered—adding, however, that any definitive settlement needed to be backed by "a very substantial means of enforcement." The Colonial Secretary continued:

"It may result from this necessity [need for enforcement] that the United Nations is now obliged to aim at a more modest objective, and to use all practical means at its disposal to prevent developments in Palestine from endangering the peace of the world without seeking at this time to arrive at a final solution of the problem which has baffled the mandatory power over so long a period. In these efforts the United Kingdom delegation will co-operate to the best of its ability, subject of course to limitations involved in the decision of my government to terminate their responsibility for the administration of Palestine next month and to withdraw the last of our forces before the beginning of August."

The First Committee adjourned further consideration of the issue until April 26, when it was said priority would be given to the French resolution on measures to protect Jerusalem. Accordingly, general debate was interrupted, and attention was directed to the proposal submitted by France on the 22nd to ask the Trusteeship Council to study the security situation in Jerusalem. Sweden proposed an amendment to the French resolution, under which the Trusteeship Council would "study" measures for the protection of the city and report back to the Assembly, rather than actually take measures by itself. This was accepted by the French delegate. During discussion which followed Australia and Czechoslovakia each submitted further amendments, but both were defeated and the Political Committee adopted (by a vote of 38 to 5, with 9 abstentions) the French resolution as amended by Sweden. The amended resolution received strong United States support.

The New Zealand delegate suggested that Committee I be adjourned and the Assembly called to order. This action was taken, whereupon the General Assembly approved by a vote of 46 to 0, with 7 abstentions (without discussion), the resolution of the First Committee. General debate was then resumed by the Committee, with the Uruguayan representative reaffirming his support for partition. Speaking on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, Jamal el-Husseini repeated the Arab position that temporary trusteeship should be considered only as a prelude to the establishment of an independent single state in the Holy Land--with safeguards to protect the Jewish minority.

General debate was concluded on the morning of the 27th, during which time Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency termed the trusteeship plan "totally unreal," and that "for all those who have eyes to see, the Jewish State already exists." The First Committee next proceeded to a consideration of the United States proposal to refer the working paper, "Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine," to Committee Four (Trusteeship) for "study and report, with recommendations thereon, to the General Assembly."

Dr. Jessup (U. S.) explained at some length the main provisions of the draft agreement--stressing that the "success or failure of a temporary trusteeship, or of any other form of government for Palestine, will turn upon the degree of co-operation existing among the various elements of the population." The American representative also proposed that the various delegations express their views on the "key portions" of the working paper--designed as a procedural move and not to reflect an indication of the substantive merits of the trusteeship suggestions. Gromyko added that the Political Committee should vote on whether to begin discussion of the United States proposals. The vote was taken, and approval expressed 38 to 7, with 7 abstentions. The Soviet bloc and Haiti were in opposition.

On the 28th, debate in the Assembly's First Committee centered about procedural issues arising from the decision of the previous day to examine the working paper. A resolution was submitted by Guatemala for a subcommittee to consult with the British, Arabs, Jews, and the Palestine Commission as to whether the temporary trusteeship would be acceptable. Syria (with Egypt in agreement) charged that the Guatemalan proposal--coupled with Soviet opposition to any discussion of the United States plan--might prevent a decision from being reached by the special session--thereby permitting partition advocates to press the claim that partition "is a fact."

The procedural debate continued to occupy the greater part of the Committee's session of April 29. However, at the close of the meeting there was general agreement that the Political Committee should begin a discussion of the United States plan for a temporary U. N. trusteeship over the Holy Land. A list of the main points of the working paper was to be distributed for the Committee's use at the meeting scheduled for the following day.

Consular Truce Commission

At a meeting on April 23, the Security Council adopted a United States resolution--as amended by Belgium, France, Syria, Lebanon, the Jewish

Agency for Palestine, and the Arab Higher Committee--establishing a Truce Commission for Palestine, composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council which have career consular officers in Jerusalem. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 8 to 0, with three abstentions--Colombia, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union. Syria indicated, however, that it was not prepared to have a representative serve on the Commission.

The Truce Commission, as named, comprised the career consular officers in Jerusalem of Belgium, France, and the United States. The group was instructed on April 24 to report back "within four days" on the situation in strife-ridden Palestine.

The Security Council president was advised by the Truce Commission in Palestine on the 29th that it had sent the following telegram to King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan--warning against "any war-like decision or action":

"The Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine has been informed that the Government of Trans-Jordan has decided upon a general mobilization and that Trans-Jordan forces will shortly march across the Palestine frontiers. As Your Majesty is aware, the U. N. General Assembly at this time is discussing the question of Palestine.

"Moreover, the Security Council, acting in accordance with the U. N. Charter, is at present considering the problem of maintenance of peace in the country and has created this Truce Commission for the purpose of bringing about a truce from hostilities in the Holy Land.

"Any war-like decision or action on the part of Trans-Jordan will undoubtedly be the cause of gravest censure by the Security Council and the entire United Nations as a possible threat to peace. Accordingly the Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine urges Your Majesty in strongest terms to abstain from any military decisions or acts which may be under contemplation by Your Majesty's Government."

The Truce Commission advised, as April closed, that fighting was increasing steadily in the Holy Land and that operations on a "larger and more important scale than Haifa are expected shortly." The report from the Commission was read by the Security Council president before the Political Committee of the General Assembly, but no discussion ensued.

Trusteeship Council Action

Meeting for the first time in April on the 21st, the Trusteeship Council (8 to 0, with 3 abstentions) agreed to refer the question of the formal approval of the Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem to the General Assembly. The United Nations Secretary-General advised the president of the Assembly of a Trusteeship Council Resolution which declared that, "having completed its discussion on the draft statute" and deciding that the "statute is now in satisfactory form and [agreeing] that the question of its formal approval, together with the appointment of a Governor of the City, shall be taken up at a subsequent meeting to be held not later than one week before 29 April 1948," referred the matter to the General Assembly for "such further instructions as [it] may see fit to give."

The Soviet Union, on the 25th, ended a thirteen-month boycott of the Trusteeship Council when Gromyko announced that his government would fill the vacancy held for them since March 1947, when the Council was organized. Semon M. Tsarapkin, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, was named to occupy the post.

The special session of the General Assembly directed the Council on the 26th to undertake to study suitable measures for the protection of Jerusalem and its inhabitants--following Assembly approval by a 46 to 0 vote of a French-Swedish proposal on the matter. A meeting was immediately called for the 27th. When the session opened, the French delegate called attention to the Truce Commission established by the Security Council on April 23 to supervise a truce. He expressed doubt that the group could achieve "satisfactory results" since the Commission had no force at its disposal. The French representative suggested that a volunteer international police force of 1,000 men be created who would be "symbolic of U.N.'s interest." On a suggestion made by Belgium and China, the Council agreed to talk in a closed session during the afternoon with representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and of the Jewish Agency to ascertain if both accepted the principle of a truce for Jerusalem. In the course of this meeting, both sides stated their views--the spokesman of the Arab Higher Committee indicating that he would seek "additional instructions" from his organization.

Francis B. Sayre (Council president) announced on April 28 that an accord had been reached between the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency--to recommend a truce plan banning all military activity within the walled City of Jerusalem. The president added that efforts were being made to see whether the truce could be extended to those areas of Jerusalem beyond its walls. Moshe Shertok (Jewish Agency spokesman) stated he would cable the Agency in Palestine recommending the "cease fire" order. Jalem el-Husseini (Arab Committee) advised he had already made a like recommendation to his organization.

Efforts to broaden the truce accord were continued throughout the 29th. During a meeting of the Council, el-Husseini rejected the French proposal for a volunteer international police force under a "U.N.-appointed commander" to keep order in Jerusalem. While acknowledging that the force might be "mostly symbolic" and that peace really depended upon the truce accord between Jews and Arabs, the spokesman objected on the grounds that this "token force" might be used "for political purposes and might be the beginning of the implementation of Palestine partition." On the other hand, the Jewish Agency representative held that an adequate force or a truce "covering all of Jerusalem" was needed to prevent the city from being turned into a battleground.

No progress was visible in Trusteeship Council moves on April 30 toward truce efforts. The U. S. deputy representative offered a new proposal for the prompt completion of a "provisional arrangement for a special temporary regime in Jerusalem." He pointed out that the "United Nations owes an obligation to mankind to do everything in its power to avoid the catastrophe of possible destruction of the most sacred places of three of the world's great religions." The spokesman then stated that the United States was prepared "along with other members of the United Nations, to

take its share of ... responsibility" for such a procedure. After a different plan for interim emergency rule of the city had been presented by the British delegate, the Council adjourned in order to study the alternate proposals.

Arab League

One of the principal topics on the agenda of the Arab League's Political Committee, which reconvened in Cairo on April 10, was said to be whether King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan should--with his Arab Legion--occupy Palestine following termination of the British mandate on May 15.

To "top strategists" of the League in attendance at the sessions, Foreign Minister Fawzi Mulki Pasha (Trans-Jordan), speaking against the trusteeship plan, said it would be "more dangerous than a mandate... . We do not know whether it would be in the hands of one or more than one country, but we are sure it would be in the hands of those sympathizing with the Jews. That is why we reject it and any other solution that would not be final to the Holy Land problem."

Speaking before the Arab League on the 13th, Ismail Safwat Pasha (Commander-in-Chief of the Arab People's Army), according to "informed Sources" advised against widening the scope of present military operation in Palestine until sufficient arms, equipment, and trained men were available to successfully cope with Jewish opposition. "Anticipating" an Arab League plan to occupy Palestine with the Trans-Jordan Arab Legion (this well-armed and highly trained body to supply the strength needed, and possibly to be headed by Safwat Pasha) and to set up a provisional government under the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini, King Farouk of Egypt sent the following message to the Arab leaders:

"If Arab armies enter Palestine to save the country, His Majesty would like it clearly understood that this measure must be regarded as a temporary solution devoid of any nature of the occupation or partition of Palestine. After liberation, Palestine must be handed over to its own people who will elect the government it pleases."

The Egyptian King added: "This is my opinion." On April 16 "well-informed" sources stated that the League's Political Committee had definitely decided that "Arab regular armies" would enter the Holy Land immediately after May 15.

A week later (24th), King Abdullah said: "I call on all Arab countries to join my army [after May 15] in a movement to Palestine to retain the Arab character of that country." On the same day representatives of Arab nations met at Amman, Trans-Jordan, to discuss the Holy Land conflict. Ismail Safwat Pasha declared: "I have long ago reported to the Arab League that the Arab Liberation Army now in Palestine cannot save the situation. That is why the League's military committee is meeting here. We shall reach positive decisions for quick action to face the military situation."

Following upon increasing violence, Trans-Jordan "Government sources" stated on April 29 that at least 30,000 regular troops from Arab

states would "rescue Palestine before May 15"--these forces to be under the command of King Abdullah.

On April 30, in a further report from Amman, the military leaders of Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt agreed on a long-term campaign against the Palestine Jews. Agreeing on "complete unity" in the warfare to be undertaken, the following steps were reportedly decided upon: (1) the Arabs to hold strategic positions in Palestine after May 15, using the Trans-Jordan Arab Legion, units of the Syrian and Lebanese armies and some Iraqi troops; (2) Egypt to provide artillery units, with officers and men, and planes with pilots and maintenance crews for Trans-Jordan forces; and (3) the regular Egyptian Army to assume responsibility for southern Palestine.

Zionist Council Meeting

The General Council of the World Zionist Organization convened in Tel Aviv on April 6 to consider the Jewish position toward the proposals made in the United Nations for a truce and for temporary trusteeship for Palestine. Other subjects for discussion were Zionist finances and Jewish affairs in Palestine. While the sessions were closed, it was announced on the 12th (the final day of the meeting) that an agreement had been approved which provided for military co-ordination (but not political) between the Haganah and Irgun Zvai Leumi organizations. Under the accord, Irgun Zvai Leumi, while retaining its military structure, agreed to take no independent military action but to operate under the command of Haganah.

The Council unanimously adopted (12th) a resolution "to set up an organ of supreme authority of our national independence in Palestine." Offering peace and friendship to the Arabs and calling on all Jews, especially those of Palestine, to join in the task, the resolution expressed a determination not "to remain a minority dependent on the sufferance of others" and declared: "We have resolved this day that the termination of the mandatory government of Palestine shall in fact mark the end of all foreign domination in this country. With the termination of this mandatory rule, a government of the Jewish state shall come into being."

"Well-informed" sources in Jerusalem advised on the 13th that David Ben-Gurion would be named as Premier of the provisional Jewish Government on May 16. On April 18, in Tel Aviv, a potential cabinet of the Hebrew state, "The Jewish Council of Thirteen," met for discussion of cabinet portfolios and the "possible creation" of a war cabinet.

The General Zionist Council issued a revised declaration of independence in Jerusalem on the 22nd to counter widespread criticism of the original text agreed upon at Tel Aviv on the 12th--which had contained references to British "domination." The revised version pointed out that "we are a peaceful people, and we are here to build in peace. Let us [Arabs and Jews] then build our state together as equal citizens, with equal rights and obligations, with mutual trust and respect, each with a true understanding of the other's needs."

Internal Violence

A Jewish-Arab convoy war flared in Palestine early in April. With the food situation in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem approaching emergency status, Arab forces undertook to prevent food supplies from reaching the city. Warfare centered in the strategically located village of Kastel on the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road. Strong Haganah forces captured the village on the 3rd, only to have the Arabs recapture it on the 8th—at the price of the life of their commander, Abdel Kader el-Husseini, head of the Palestinian Arab National Guard. Thereafter, claims conflicted as to which side held the location. However, some convoys did reach Jerusalem, including one of 178 vehicles on the 13th and another of 285 vehicles on the 17th.

Another large-scale battle raged farther north, where the Arabs attempted to capture the Jewish settlement of Mishmar Haemek at the western end of Esdraelon valley. The Arabs first attacked on April 5, but by the 12th the Jews had gone on the offensive and in succeeding days captured 10 villages to the south and east, causing considerable Arab losses.

Raiders of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, in an effort to obtain weapons, attacked a British Army camp as it was being evacuated on April 6 and killed six Britons, including the commanding major and four men the enemy had captured. A joint assault on the 9th by Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern gang on Deir Yasin, near Jerusalem, resulted in the deaths of 254 Arabs—half of them women and children. The attack was denounced by the Jewish Agency Executive as "utterly repugnant" to the Jewish spirit, and by the secretary of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee as a "massacre of the innocents." Later the Haganah formally occupied the village. They stated that the action "disgraced the cause of Jewish fighters and dishonored Jewish arms and the Jewish flag."

Heavy caliber shells, fired by the Arab artillery of Fawzi el-Kawukji's liberation army on April 10, fell on Jerusalem—killing three Jews and injuring seven. The first Egyptian force to see action in Palestine raided the settlement of Kfar Darom, close to the Egyptian border, on the 11th.

Charges that Soviet commanders were leading Jewish forces in Palestine were voiced by King Abdullah on the 17th and by the Syrian military liaison officer to the Arab League on the 18th. Abdullah expressed the fear that there would be "shiploads of Jews, Russians and arms filing into Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jaffa. Then you will have another Spain, with Anglo-Saxons fighting Russians, and then will come a third world war." Jewish denials of the charges were made both in Palestine and New York. The political chief of the Jewish Agency declared that there "never was a single Russian officer commanding or instructing Jewish soldiers in the Holy Land."

Tiberias, capital of lower Galilee, was announced by Haganah on the 19th as being "completely under control of a Jewish municipal administration," following the departure of the 6,000 Arab inhabitants from the city. The evacuation, completed under military supervision, was confirmed by the British. In an explanation of the event, the Jewish Community Council of Tiberias stated: "We did not dispossess them. They themselves chose

this course but the day will come when they will return to this town. Let no citizen in the meantime touch their property."

The Jewish Agency informed the Security Council on April 19 that news directly received indicated "that units of the Arab Legion [had] actively participated in an attack on a Jewish settlement and [were] giving aid and protection to Arab bands operating in different parts of Palestine." It was explained that the Arab Legion units in the Holy Land formed an integral part of the British forces--being commander by a British officer and financed with British funds--according to the terms of the Anglo-Trans-Jordan Treaty, renewed in March 1948. It was pointed out that this fact placed responsibility for the Arab Legion "squarely on the United Kingdom Government."

Reference was made to a statement by Sir Alexander Cadogan that the Arab Legion units would be withdrawn from Palestine before May 15, but the Jewish Agency said that "in view of the provisions of the Treaty, the responsibility of the United Kingdom for the activities of the Arab Legion does not end with the termination of the Mandate but obtains as long as the Treaty is valid." They took the position that Great Britain was obliged, even after May 15, to ensure that Arab forces "abstain from lawless acts." The Agency urged the Security Council to remind both Great Britain and Trans-Jordan of their obligations.

After a day-long struggle on the 20th, a convoy of 260 vehicles--carrying more than 1,000 tons of food and other supplies--made its way through Arab resistance into the Jewish section of Jerusalem from Tel Aviv.

A "high British officer" said on April 21 that approximately 25,000 Arabs had moved out of the vital port city of Haifa at the start of a Jewish-Arab fight for its control. On the following day, in a furious battle which took the lives of scores of Jews and Arabs, and in which Arab resistance was swiftly overcome, the Haganah occupied Haifa. Arab men, women and children fled from the city by the "thousands." British forces and officials withdrew to the port area. According to the Haganah, by nightfall the Arabs had decided upon evacuation and had agreed to surrender all arms to the British military who, in turn, were to transfer them to the Jews following termination of the May 15 mandate. Lebanese fishing smacks, schooners, and sailing vessels went to the aid of Palestine Arabs in their flight from Haifa.

Lieut. Gen. Sir Alan Cunningham, British High Commissioner in the Holy Land, placed the blame upon the Arabs for having provoked the Jews, through continuous Arab attack, for their fierce assault on the city. On the 23rd, the Jewish military commander in Haifa proclaimed "Haganah military law"--which required all residents to obey the Jewish military police, and threatened punishment for the looting of Arab property or the violation of Moslem or Christian shrines.

The Haganah entered the struggle for Jaffa on the 28th, but appeared to be operating apart from Irgun Zvai Leumi. Attacks were made upon Jaffa border villages by Haganah, while the Irgunists fought within the city area. The following day, an eighteen-hour cease-fire order was agreed to by both the Jews and Arabs at Jaffa--after an ultimatum had been

delivered by the British mandate government to the Jewish Agency threatening "unlimited military intervention" unless they ceased their attacks on the city. Concerning truce talks, which continued on the 30th, no official comment was released.

As the month ended, however, the Haganah began the "battle for Jerusalem"--attacking and infiltrating the Christian Arab Katamon quarter and dominating, by nightfall, added sections of Arab Jerusalem. Arab reinforcements were hastened to the scene from Jericho, Bethlehem, and Hebron. Sir Alan Cunningham warned the Jewish Agency that unless their offensive was halted, the Royal Air Force would "attack Jewish quarters."

C. PROPAGANDIST ACTIVITIES

Conference on Freedom of Information

During April, the Conference on Freedom of Information, meeting in Geneva, continued its efforts to remove barriers to the free flow of information. The president said on April 2 that "considering its subject matter is made to order for the most bitter ideological battles imaginable," in his view the Conference had exceeded expectations. He pointed out that "while the west insists on as wide a freedom as possible, Eastern European countries stress responsibilities that go with freedom. While the west defends the right to criticize, Eastern European countries consider that criticism too often turns into slander. This does not seem to create a gulf. In a real sense, the difference is mainly a difference of emphasis."

The Conference--which was convened on March 23--ended on April 21, after three days of plenary meetings, following committee sessions. The work of the gathering was summed up in a Final Act, accepted by a vote of 30 to 1 (Poland), with five abstentions (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia). To the Act were attached three annexes containing three draft conventions, the Articles for inclusion in the Draft Declaration and Draft Covenant on Human Rights, and the Resolutions adopted by the Conference. The Act proposes that the Economic and Social Council, at its next session, examine the decisions of the Conference, study the Draft Conventions, and submit them, with recommendations, to the next session of the General Assembly. The three Draft Conventions comprised, in part, the following:

1. Draft Convention on the Gathering and International Transmission of News (originally submitted by the United States). Provision made for freedom of entry into and travel within any contracting state for any authorized foreign correspondent of another contracting state; free transmission of news to and from any contracting state; and under normal conditions no censorship of such news. In instances, where for reasons of national security, peacetime censorship is in existence, the Convention declared that the categories of news liable to censorship shall be set forth in advance.

2. Draft Convention Concerning the Institution of an International Right of Correction (originally submitted by France). Confined to the limited field of news reports sent from one country to another by a foreign correspondent or news agency, provision is made that any contracting state may submit a correction to the government of the state in whose territory the original report appeared, and that the latter government, whatever its view of the matter, shall make public the correction.

3. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information (originally presented by Great Britain). An attempt to outline the freedoms associated with freedom of information, and to set the limits within which restrictions on these freedoms may be applied. One clause stipulates that any dispute arising out of the Convention between any two contracting states should be referred to the International Court of Justice.

The three Conventions will enter into force when any two of the states participating in the Conference deposit instruments of accession with the Secretary-General--the first immediately upon such deposit, and the other two within 30 days.

In addition to the three Draft Conventions and the Articles for inclusion respectively in the Draft Declaration and the Draft Covenant of Human Rights, the Conference passed 43 other resolutions. One related to continuing machinery, while another, submitted by the United States, covered the general principles of freedom of information. Such subjects as the shortage of newsprint, the elimination of racial, religious and other discrimination, a condemnation of censorship, and a proposal to eliminate discriminatory taxes in the information field by bilateral agreements, were among other proposals. Also included were unanimous resolutions against war-mongering and false and distorted reporting.

For the first time, positive measures were recommended to set up continuing machinery in the information field. The three Conventions represented steps toward implementation of the principles embodied in the resolutions. The 43 additional resolutions drew attention to the major obstacles to the free flow of information and suggestions for their removal.

IV. SECURITY PROBLEMS

Following up his special message to the Congress on March 17 in which he recommended national defense measures, President Truman on April 1 notified the Congress that, in his opinion, at least \$3 billion in new defense expenditures would be needed in the fiscal year 1949. The President also asked for authority to make long-term contracts for the procurement of \$375 million for "strategic and critical materials." He cited five categories in the expanded defense list: "First, \$775 million for the requirements for added military personnel... . Second, \$775 million for the procurement of aircraft, aircraft components and aviation research and development. ... Third, \$860 million for maintenance and operation of facilities and equipment... . Fourth, \$500 million for procurement and production programs... . Fifth, \$90 million for other requirements, such as research and development... ." He explained that the new appropriations "are intended to round out and balance our national security program. They are necessary to enable us to meet our international responsibilities."

The President concluded: "It is my earnest hope that on the solid foundation of our foreign aid programs and a limited increase in our present military strength, we can achieve a substantial lessening of present international tension and move forward toward our goal of securing a just and lasting peace."

An additional statement of United States objectives under the new defense program was given later in the month by Secretary of Defense Forrestal during his appearance on April 12 before the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. He explained that "the whole aim and effort of the United States is to attain the objective of peace, to prevent differences between nations developing into armed conflict, until the United Nations has gained maturity and both the moral and physical force with which to deal with any international act of aggression. ..." He expressed the belief that the defense program advanced by the United States today "is not in contradiction of the United Nations," but "to the contrary, the strength which we advocate for the United States is a minimum necessity if we are to discharge our responsibility in the family of peoples who desire peace. We wish to make it inescapably clear that the policy of the United States is backed by alert and resolute and ready power."

A. ORGANIZATION OF A SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Reconsideration of U.N. Membership Applications

In view of the scheduled special General Assembly session, reconsideration by the Security Council of the applications of Italy and Trans-Jordan for membership in the United Nations was requested by the United States, Great Britain, and France on April 3. Both applications had already been vetoed twice by the Soviet Union.

A countermove from the Soviet bloc came on the 6th when the Ukraine asked the Council to re-examine the membership applications of

Italy, Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, and Rumania. On the following day, Soviet Delegate Gromyko indicated that he would not agree to the separate consideration of the Italian application apart from those of the other former enemy countries--Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland. He said he would favor, however, the admission of Trans-Jordan if the applications of Albania and of the Mongolian Peoples Republic were approved. Sir Alexander Cadogan (Great Britain) pointed out that this approach was not a valid one inasmuch as there was nothing in the Potsdam Agreement to the effect that the applications of ex-enemy countries be treated as a group. U. S. Delegate Austin further suggested the reconsideration of the applications of Austria, Ireland, and Portugal--also previously vetoed by the Soviet Union.

When the Security Council met formally on April 10, Italy's request was the first of the 11 to be considered. Ambassador Austin declared that "Italy's record clearly merits admission to the United Nations. ..."

Gromyko replied with the charge that the re-introduction of Italy's application was a "tactical maneuver calculated to draw some votes on the side of rightist Italian parties supported by the United States. ... The Italian people will not be fooled. They will understand that the United States and Britain want to fool the people of Italy." The Soviet delegate said that his country agreed to the admission of Italy but that its admission must not "jeopardize" the chances of other countries in the "same category."

When a vote was taken, nine states voted affirmatively, with the Soviet Union and the Ukraine in dissent. The American delegate immediately expressed his regret at "this third veto by the Soviet Union of the application of Italy," calling it "the arbitrary exercise of a special privilege which we all had reason to think, when our organization was created, would be exercised sparingly and then only on questions vitally affecting the national interests of the power exercising the privilege. ... I can only conclude, as I believe the world will, that this action means that the Soviet Union is not a friend of the people of Italy."

Ambassador Austin then said some means must be found toward giving, in the General Assembly, a nonvoting voice on matters concerning their own direct interests to nations rejected by veto despite majority Security Council approval. "The General Assembly," he stated, "is master of its own house. A formula to permit Italy and other states to have a voice could and should be found. I mean when they have a stake in what is being talked about on the Assembly floor."

No action was taken on the remainder of the requests for admission to the United Nations, after it was ascertained that none of the members had changed their stand on the other 10 applicants, and inasmuch as it appeared no useful purpose could be served in either continuing discussions or voting on the remaining applications.

Burma Admitted to U. N. Membership

At the April 10 Security Council meeting, when the various membership applications were brought up for reconsideration, the application of

Burma was also presented and was immediately accepted. The membership committee of the Council had, on March 29, approved Burma's request which had been the first to be considered under amended rules of procedure stating that such applications must contain a declaration "made in a formal instrument" that the state asking for admittance accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter.

The Security Council vote was 10 to 0, with one abstention (Argentina). The Argentine delegate, while having no objection to Burma's admittance, was forced to abstain because of lack of instructions from his government due to a delay in transmission.

The special session of the General Assembly made the admission of Burma the first item on the agenda for the meeting of April 19. It was decided unanimously to admit Burma as the fifty-eighth member of the United Nations.

Advisory Opinion of the Court on Membership

Hearings were held from April 22-24 before the International Court of Justice on a request made in November 1947 by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion as to the conditions under which a state might be admitted to membership in the United Nations. Five governments (Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, and Yugoslavia) had signified a wish to present oral statements on the question. Written statements had been submitted to the Court by 15 others, including the United States and the Soviet Union.

The competence of the Court to consider the case, which had been challenged in written statements offered by the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Yugoslavia, was defended by the French representative. On the question of admission, he emphasized three points: A member of the United Nations is obliged (1) to vote against the admission of any country that does not fulfill the conditions for membership set forth in the Charter; (2) to use discretion in deciding on admission questions; and (3) discretion does not mean arbitrariness, and making the admission of one nation conditional on the admission of other nations would be arbitrary, and therefore illegal--and in contravention of the entire system of the U. N. Charter.

The Yugoslav representative directed his argument to the competence of the Court to decide the case, maintaining that the question was political and that the Court was, therefore, not competent to decide upon it. The representative from Belgium contended that the questions submitted to the Court constituted a legal matter, and consequently lay within the competence of the Court.

1. Modification of the Veto Provisions

Proposals in U.S. Senate for U.N. Revision

During the first week of April, a campaign was inaugurated in the U.S. Senate to revise the United Nations Charter. In a bipartisan move, 16 senators on the 12th introduced on the floor of the Senate a concurrent resolution calling for revision of the Charter "with the approval of all

member states if possible; but in the event that any permanent member states should veto the proposals for revision, the United States shall join with other like-minded states in accordance with applicable provisions of the United Nations Charter or in any other manner acceptable to the majority of member states... ."

The measure contained, in part, the following provisions "deemed the minimum necessary to ensure the effective operation of the reorganized United Nations":

"Elimination of the veto right by a permanent member in the Security Council, but only in matters of aggression, armament for aggression, and admission to membership in the United Nations. Aggression shall be prohibited and defined ... as an attack with weapons of violence by a state (or its citizens) against the recognized territory of a member states; or illegal occupation by a state or territory outside the recognized and established borders of said state and its possessions. Armament for aggression shall be prohibited and defined in the Charter, as the production of atomic or other weapons of mass destruction in violation of agreements or the production of heavy armament beyond agreed quotas; or refusal to submit to inspection.

"To conform to the changes in the veto right, representation in the Security Council shall be revised so as to include: two members each from the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; one each from France and China; and two selected collectively by the remaining member states. Decisions on vetoless matters shall be made by a majority of six out of ten. ...

"Prevention of armament for aggression. In the matter of atomic weapons, this shall be accomplished by adoption of the official United States proposal for an Atomic Development Authority; in the matter of heavy armaments ... by a world-wide quota limitation of its production in the following manner: the Security Council shall establish yearly the maximum of heavy armament to be produced in the world. ...

"Establishment of an effective World Police Force, to consist of one international contingent as the active force and five national contingents operating as reserves when needed. The international contingent, under direct control of the Security Council, shall consist of volunteers recruited exclusively from the citizens of the smaller member states, and shall be equipped with the small nations' collective quote of heavy armament. ... The armed forces of the five major powers shall be the five national contingents. They shall remain under full sovereignty of their respective governments, except that in time of peace their effective strength shall be automatically limited by their agreed quotas of heavy armament production, to be fixed in the United Nations Charter... ."

The Senate resolution added that "in the event that any major state shall refuse to participate" in these provisions "for the elimination of the world armament race and the establishment of a world police force, then the revised Security Council shall proceed at once to the establishment of the international contingent," and shall also "establish an emergency

quota of heavy armament production, to be distributed by agreement among the member states in proportion to their resources, so designed as to make certain that any outside state shall be unable to compete with the overwhelming armament production of the rest of the world, nor engage in acts of aggression against member states." The measure also stipulated that until such time as these provisions for "the revised United Nations, or similar provisions," become effective, "the armed forces of the United States and its weapons of every kind shall be maintained at wholly adequate levels."

Interim Committee Consideration

A ten-nation working group of the subcommittee of the Interim Committee, set up to consider proposals on voting procedure in the Security Council, met on April 2 in closed session to continue examination of a list prepared by the secretariat of 97 possible types of decisions that might be reached by the Security Council in application of the Charter or the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The group agreed to recommend two items for exclusion from the veto. These were: "recommendation to the General Assembly on the admission of states to membership in the United Nations"; and the postponement of "consideration of or voting on the recommendation of a state for membership until the next occasion for the consideration of applications."

On the 5th, the working group accepted nine additional items relating to decisions by the Security Council. Among these were: the submission of items to the General Assembly by the Security Council for consideration regarding specific recommendations of the Assembly respecting situations or disputes which are the Council's responsibility under the Charter; agreement that items relating to the regulation of armaments and the submission to United Nations members of plans for an armaments regulation system would need the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Council; and that the acceptance of responsibilities by the Security Council, other than those provided for in the Charter and Statute of the International Court, would depend upon the specific terms of the international instrument.

At its next meeting (6th), the working group recommended the exclusion of nine types of decisions from the veto rule in the Security Council. It agreed to recommend that the determination as to whether any member of the Security Council is a party to a dispute before the Council should be considered as part of this group of veto-free procedural decisions. Another item considered in the procedural group was the "approval of rules of procedure and organization" of the Military Staff Committee.

In examining, on the 9th, the problem of Security Council recommendations to the General Assembly on suspension or expulsion of a member nation, conflicting views were presented by the working group. The United States maintained that these amounted to additional sanctions following action under Chapter VII and would be subject to the same voting procedure.

Debate centered, on April 13, on the question of determining what vote would be necessary in the Security Council as to whether a matter "is or is not procedural within the meaning" of Article 27 (2) of the Charter.

The U. S. representative suggested a different wording for the question (Article 27 (2)) as to "whether any matter before the Security Council falls within one of the categories which the Interim Committee and the General Assembly recommend should be determined by the vote of any seven members of the Security Council," which the working group decided to list as a separate item.

The United States delegate explained that the new wording was being introduced because his country believed that the Soviet Union had abused the veto power most frequently with respect to procedural matters and was, therefore, utilizing the second part of the Statement of the Four Sponsoring Powers made at San Francisco in a way "never intended for it to be used by one of the permanent members."

Both the United States wording and that suggested in the secretariat working paper were included by the group. No decision was reached as to whether either or both items would be recommended for decision by an affirmative vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Several of the delegations were not in a position to commit their governments at the time. Meeting again in closed session on the 15th, the group agreed unanimously that it was wise to define the distinction between a "situation" and a "dispute" under Article 27 (3) of the Charter. Its recommendation with respect to this distinction follows:

"In deciding whether a matter brought before the Security Council by a state or states is a dispute, or a situation, the Security Council shall hold that a dispute arises, (a) if the state or states bringing the matter before the Council, and the state or states whose conduct is impugned, agree that there is a dispute, (b) whenever the state or states bringing the matter before the Council allege that no actions or intentions of another state or other states constitute a breach of international obligations or are endangering the maintenance of international peace and security, and the state or states which are the subject of these allegations contest, or do not admit, the facts alleged or the inferences to be drawn from such allegations.

"Further, if a state bringing before the Council a matter falling under (a) or (b) above alleges that another state is violating the rights of a third state, and the latter supports the contention of the first state, then the third state shall also be deemed to be a party to the dispute. Nothing in this definition shall prevent the Council from deciding that a dispute exists in circumstances not covered by the above definition."

2. Establishment of a Permanent Interim Committee

Consideration by the Interim Committee

Working group 1 of subcommittee 4 of the Interim Committee, on the general subject of preparation of matters for the consideration of the General Assembly, held its first meeting on April 6. Two questions were considered: (1) Should a permanent committee of the Assembly be limited, as is the Interim Committee, to preparatory work on questions concerning political and security matters submitted for the agenda of the Assembly, or should

its functions be enlarged? (2) Should such a permanent committee have authority to formulate draft resolutions or recommendations to be submitted to main committees of the Assembly or to that body directly? The suggestion was made that the present powers of the Interim Committee, "to consider and report, with its conclusions, to the General Assembly," might be regarded as including this power, and that it would be for the Interim Committee to decide in each case if it wished to present recommendations.

At the working group session on the 13th, further study was given to the scope of the projected permanent committee, and the secretariat was asked, on the basis of four drafts on the subject (submitted by Bolivia, China, the Netherlands, and Uruguay) to prepare a paper on the subject.

3. Co-operation in the Maintenance of Peace and Security

Consideration by the Interim Committee

Subcommittee 2 of the Interim Committee, set up on March 2 to examine methods for giving effect to the Charter provisions on the general principles of international co-operation in the maintenance of peace and security, commenced on April 1 a detailed study of various proposals submitted on the subject. The first to be considered was the Lebanese proposal for the creation of a Permanent Committee of Conciliation. The delegate from Lebanon asserted that the United Nations needed such an organ to perform the task of conciliation of disputes, above "chance and political fluctuations." The Dominican Republic and Venezuela jointly suggested that such a committee might be combined with a system of panels of conciliators, as was set forth in the United States-Chinese proposal of February 16. Lebanon, however, stated that it considered the two methods incompatible.

Discussion then centered around the composition of the proposed committee, the legality of such a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly taking over conciliation functions in the field of international peace and security, and authority of the proposed Committee to recommend terms of settlement in a dispute when the parties concerned failed to agree.

On the 7th, subcommittee 2 continued its discussion on the Lebanese proposal. The delegate from Lebanon pointed out that the Permanent Committee of Conciliation would be a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, but would have a mandate from the Assembly to be "seized directly by the parties concerned." It would not deal with cases under consideration by the Security Council or the Assembly unless such cases were referred to it by those organs. Its purpose would be to settle disputes before they became a threat to world peace. In that way the Committee, according to Lebanon, would have an advantage over the Security Council, which operates in an atmosphere of "pride, politics, and narrow nationalism." The Colombian delegate pointed out that the Security Council has been trying conciliation in the India-Pakistan question for about four months without much success, and that a Permanent Committee of Conciliation could have made much more rapid progress.

The subcommittee next met on April 14, and examined the joint United States-Chinese proposals of November 16, 1947 relating to machinery

to be used by the Interim Committee and specific tasks designed to carry out the purposes of the General Assembly resolution establishing that Committee. The Belgian and British representatives each explained proposals by their governments bearing upon conciliation functions.

4. International Control of Atomic Energy

U.N. Working Committee Discussions on Soviet Proposals Ended

The Working Committee met on April 5 to consider further the four-nation report and resolution--declaring that no useful purpose could be served by further discussion of the Soviet proposals of June 11, 1947--submitted to the Committee on March 27.

Soviet Delegate Gromyko told the Committee that his insistence upon putting into effect an international convention prohibiting atomic bombs as the first step did not preclude the later establishment of a system of international inspection and control. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had already suggested a control system, but that it considered that a "continuous" system of inspection would be equivalent to international control of atomic plants. He argued that the Soviet proposals of last June should be considered together with those of June 1946 and the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Despite the fact that the British representative termed the Gromyko statement "a measured and reasonable one," in contrast to his remarks of a week earlier, the Committee voted (9 to 2) to adopt the report and resolution. The Soviet Union and the Ukraine opposed the action. Acting as the Control Committee had done on March 20, the Working Committee adjourned without setting a date for a future meeting.

Atomic Weapon Tested

The U. S. Atomic Energy Commission announced on April 19 that "there has been a test of an atomic weapon at the proving grounds ... on Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. For security reasons the date of the test is not being announced." The Commission said that a report of the results was being made to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of Congress, adding: "The test was conducted under full security restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and pursuant to the provisions of the act, the public issuance of further information concerning the test is not permissible at present."

5. Regulation of Conventional Armaments

U.N. Working Committee

Meeting on April 6 for the first time since March 8, the Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments continued discussion of the revised British draft resolution setting forth principles to govern the formulation of proposals for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Amendments to the resolution were offered by the United States, Canada, and Colombia.

The American proposals were declared by U. S. Delegate Frederick Osborn to be of "a clarifying nature," and that with their inclusion the United States would support the British resolution. The Canadian amendment, involving a slight change of wording, was accepted by the United Kingdom representative, as were also the American amendments. The British delegate withheld comment on the Colombian amendment, calling for nationalization of the armaments industries, pending further discussion on April 13.

During the discussion, Osborn said that "unofficial publications" (the only source of information available with regard to the Soviet Union) indicated that "the Soviet military expenditures for the year 1947 amounted to more than 1/8 of its gross national product and 1/7 of its national income." This, it was pointed out, was more than twice the proportion of United States expenditures for military purposes which "in the same year were less than 1/16 of the gross national product." Adding that Committee records clearly showed that nine governments had consistently discussed armaments regulation and reduction, the U. S. representative questioned why the Soviet and Ukrainian delegates were making "extraordinary misrepresentations, [and] unjustifiable accusations as to the motives of the United Kingdom, the United States, and other nations... ."

Soviet Delegate Gromyko replied that Mr. Osborn had qualified statements made by the Ukrainian and Soviet representatives as "irresponsible." He (Gromyko) charged that certain states, led by the United States and Great Britain, were attempting to wreck the General Assembly decision on armaments, and added that "all the world" knew what nations were engaged in an armaments race and what ones were sincerely desirous of seeing a reduction and regulation of armaments and armed forces.

B. REGIONAL PROBLEMS

1. The Inter-American System

During April attention in the Western Hemisphere was focussed on the Ninth International Conference of American States which had convened at Bogotá, Colombia, on March 30. In his address to the Conference on April 1 U.S. Secretary of State Marshall especially called "attention to the close relationship between the solemn pacts we are here to conclude at Bogotá and the treaty of reciprocal assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro," saying that "these pacts, when ratified, will form a harmonious whole guaranteeing the social, cultural and economic progress of the Americas and at the same time the preservation of their independence, security and sovereignty."

The Conference was violently interrupted, however, on April 9 by an outbreak of violence in Bogotá--presumably motivated by the assassination of Jorge E. Gaitán, leader of the Liberal party. News of the assassination spread quickly and mobs, which formed almost instantly, rushed through the streets crying "Down with the Conservatives!" The city was thrown into complete confusion. Many buildings were looted, and set afire. Communication with the outside world was virtually cut off. One radio outlet through the U. S. Embassy was used as a pool for correspondents.

President Perez announced the formation of a new coalition cabinet on April 10. Commenting on this, the Colombian delegate to the United Nations said he expected its creation would restore normal conditions. On the 11th, the new cabinet decreed martial law and a "state of seige" in the capital. The government radio attributed the uprising to "foreign agents under the direction of Moscow." Secretary of State Marshall (on the 12th) placed the blame for the revolt on international communism, saying:

"This situation must not be judged on a local basis, however tragic the immediate results to the Colombian people. The occurrence goes far beyond Colombia. It is the same definite pattern as occurrences which provoked strikes in France and Italy, and that is endeavoring to prejudice the situation in Italy, where elections will be held on April 18. In actions we take here regarding the present situation, we must keep clearly in mind the fact that this is a world affair--not merely Colombian or Latin American."

Because of the outbreak of violence, fear had been expressed that the Inter-American conference would not be resumed. However, the delegates of the American states met on the 11th and unanimously decided that the sessions would continue. They were finally resumed on the 14th.

By April 15, Bogotá--after approximately a week of disturbance--was slowly returning to normalcy. The general strike that the Colombian Workers Confederation had ordered on the 9th came to an end, and workmen began co-operating with the government in cleaning up the rubble-strewn city.

The Conference sessions were continued throughout the month without further interruption and were finally concluded on April 30 when the 21 American states represented at the Conference signed two treaties, two conventions, and various resolutions. Foremost among these documents is the treaty-charter of the Organization of the American States, which gives organic status to the 58-year old Pan American Union as a regional group under the United Nations.

The second treaty, the Pact of Bogotá, consolidated twenty years' work on pacific settlement and methods of arbitration, conciliation, and mediation. To this treaty the United States filed two reservations, which disapproved of submitting political as well as legal disputes to the International Court of Justice, and opposed a provision by which aliens are prohibited from receiving diplomatic aid when they are being tried in the courts of an alien nation. The Pact of Bogotá also embodied a declaration of diplomatic relations, providing that the continuance of such relations does not imply approval of the internal policies of one country by another.

In this section a report on the activities of the Conference is covered under the topics of the Organic Pact, the Anti-Communist Resolution, and the Colonial Issue. A report on the economic questions considered at the Conference is given earlier in this Summary in the section on Economic and Social Problems.

The Organic Pact

Discussion of the Organic Pact for the Americas began on April 2, with Argentina opposing the strengthening of the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union. The United States took the view that the draft of the re-organization of the Union, arrived at in February 1948, was fundamentally sound and with a few modifications would be acceptable. Objecting on the 5th to the incorporation of the proposed Inter-American Defense Council with the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, Argentina said that such "collective action" was contrary to the inter-American principle of non-intervention and was the "basic element of the super-state."

The U. S. Ambassador to Colombia, speaking of the proposed extension of the authority of the Governing Board, stated that the United States was "not prepared to grant any broad or undetermined political powers to the Governing Board. Nor does the United States," he continued, "believe it desirable to prohibit completely the exercise of political powers by the Board."

On the same day (5th), U. S. Assistant Secretary of State Armour declared that the United States considered the draft pact "an excellent basis for discussion," and he believed that "adequate language can be found which will insure that the Pan American Union will carry out its responsibilities as the central and permanent agency of the system within definite limitations ... and under the direction and authorization of the governments." On the 6th, an Argentine spokesman stated that the United States and Argentina had agreed in principle that the planning of hemisphere defense should remain in the hands of military leaders.

The United States on April 7 submitted amendments to the draft of the Organic Pact--designed to clarify the relationship between the inter-American system and the United Nations. It was suggested that Articles 1 and 2 of the reciprocal aid treaty of Rio de Janeiro, condemning war and the threat or use of force, be included in the agreement. The delegation proposed that the principles of the inter-American peace system be:

"An obligation to resort to peaceful procedures.

"An obligation to endeavor to settle the matter by the procedures of the inter-American system before resorting to the United Nations.

"Broad powers of consultation, assistance, and recommendation on the part of the organ of consultation, with a view to assisting the parties in finding an agreed procedure of settlement.

"Compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in legal cases.

"The establishment of other procedures to be availed of when deemed appropriate."

Discussion of the Organic Pact was resumed on the 14th by the senior members of the various delegations comprising the steering committee. Argentina's objections to the name for the inter-American system were

overcome by the introduction of a compromise text. By a vote of 11 to 10 the new organization was called the "Organization of American States." It was also unanimously agreed that the American States would constitute a regional body within the United Nations organization.

The following day (15th) Argentina announced that it had accepted a proposed United States amendment related to the authority of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. The amendment confined the powers of the Board to "any matter within the limits of the present pact and the inter-American treaties ... assigned to it by the international conferences of the American states or meetings of the Foreign Ministers, or by the specific authorization of the member Governments."

One article provided that the foreign ministers of the American states should be called into session immediately in the case of armed attack, and that the Governing Board should be summoned to session simultaneously. This appeared to satisfy the "super-state" argument of the Argentine delegation.

On the 17th, the steering committee discussed the incorporation of the proposed inter-American Defense Council in the Organic Pact. Argentina continued its objection to this, contending that the Council should receive instructions directly from governments and not from the Pan American Union. Agreement was reached on the 19th. It was decided that the Inter-American Defense Board, established in 1942, would remain as a permanent organ to handle hemispheric defense questions. However, a new consultative defense committee is to be formed, to be composed of the highest military authorities, and to become a decisive military group in the event of threat to the Western Hemisphere.

The same day (19th) a majority report on the Pan American Union was adopted by a vote of 17 to 3, with 1 abstention. Through this agreement, the Union's Governing Board becomes a permanent organ, with powers as outlined in the United States amendment.

By the 26th, the Charter was approved for final adoption at the closing session of the conference on April 30. The Organic Pact establishes as a legal entity the Organization of American States, putting into codified form the machinery developed among American countries during the past 50 years.

Under the jurisdiction of the new organization are the international conferences of American states, meetings of American foreign ministers, specialized conferences, the Council of the organization, Pan American Union, and other specialized agencies. The principal change is in the organization of the Pan American Union. Previously, the Union included the Governing Board and the general secretariat. However, under the new agreement the two are organically separated. The Governing Board becomes the Council of the whole Organization of American States, with consultative powers, while the Pan American Union remains the secretariat and the permanent central organ to promote economic, social, juridicial, and cultural relations among the member states.

The principal political organ of the organization is the Council of Foreign Ministers, which may be summoned into conference at the request of one member state and a majority vote in the Council of the organization. The Foreign Ministers' Council also has jurisdiction over the Inter-American Defense Council of military leaders, which is established as an independent agency. It was further decided that the basic rights and duties of states would be included in the body of the Organic Pact, and that a bill of rights of individuals would be a separate document.

Anti-Communist Action

The issue of communism came to the foreground on April 1, when the Argentine Prime Minister, Juan Bramuglia, remarked during his formal address to the conference: "We did not come here to persecute consequences, but to combat causes." This statement was taken as a formal announcement that Argentina would not join in an anti-communist Western Hemisphere pact.

The following day, Secretary of State Marshall met privately with the chiefs of the Argentine, Brazilian, Colombian and Venezuelan delegations. At this time, it was said, Bramuglia expressed Argentina's conviction that the best method to combat communism was through the tightening of security measures by individual countries. On the 3rd, Marshall met in conference with Chilean Defense Minister Juvenal Hernandez on the anti-communism resolution. The Secretary of State declined to comment, saying only that they had considered what form the resolution "regarding subversive activities" should take. But the Chilean Defense Minister declared that "the principal topic of conversation was the necessity of defending the democratic ways of America."

Discussion of possible anti-communist action continued in private meetings. However, a Chilean spokesman on the 19th said that the text, which was being prepared, went considerably further than the original proposal of that country earlier in the month. It was reported, also, that Argentina, Uruguay, and others, were opposing any action involving multi-lateral procedure against the Communists.

On April 21, the United States, Chile, Brazil, and Peru presented a draft resolution condemning international communism. The resolution was based on the original Chilean proposal, and stated that the American republics, agreeing that they have "equal interest and ... responsibility in the preservation of the peace, integrity, solidarity, and security of the Hemisphere; [that they are] convinced that in the present condition of the world, international communism ... is an instrument of aggression for imperialistic purposes and constitutes a menace for their free democratic republics; [that] communism is diametrically opposed to liberty and leads to totalitarian control; [and that] communism, in order to facilitate its penetration, deliberately foments civil strife, internal strife, and economic instability; ... resolve:

"(1) To reaffirm their decision to maintain and stimulate a social and economic policy designed to raise the living standard of their peoples; and their conviction that only through political and civil liberty can this objective be achieved.

"(2) To unite in fervent condemnation of the methods of all totalitarian political systems, and in particular of the methods of international communism that violently destroy civil liberties and rights and replaces them by tyranny.

"(3) To adopt within their respective territories ... all necessary measures to impede and uproot activities directed, assisted or instigated by foreign governments, groups of individuals which are designed to subvert their institutions, foment disorder in their internal policy or reduce by pressure, propaganda menaces or any other manner the free, sovereign right of their peoples to govern themselves according to their own democratic aspirations.

"(4) To use the fullest interchange of information about the above-mentioned activities which develop within their respective jurisdictions."

The Venezuelan Delegate, Betancourt, argued for revision of the draft, saying that notice should also be taken of a possible Fascist threat and dictatorial regimes. However, the Mexican representative insisted that such a defense of democracy would be inadequate unless economic privation, which undermines democracy, was also included. After two hours of debate, the text of the proposed resolution was finally referred to a special committee of 12 nations.

On the 22nd, the special committee submitted a redraft of the anti-communist resolution, which condemned "the methods of international communism," as well as the "methods of every totalitarian political system." It also maintained that the present international situation demanded urgent measures to keep "agents in the service of international communism, or of any other totalitarianism, from tampering with the true will of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere." The new draft was basically the same as the one proposed by the United States, Chile, Brazil, and Peru on the previous day, and was unanimously approved by the steering committee.

Colonial Issue

The issue of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere was introduced to the inter-American conference by the Venezuelan Delegate, Romulo Betancourt, in his speech before the plenary session on April 6. He contended that the existence of such colonies in the Western Hemisphere weakened faith in the inter-American system. Betancourt urged that measures be taken to gain independence for all European colonies in the Americas, including Jamaica, the Guianas, and Puerto Rico. He proposed plebiscites among those peoples to determine whether they wished complete independence or to live under the guidance of one of the American republics.

The Venezuelan delegate claimed for his country the right to the Guianas and the Caribbean islands, which previously had been part of its territory under Spain, and asserted claims to Aruba, Curaçao, and Bonaire. He said: "We consider incompatible with the inter-American juridical system any historic, economic, or strategic argument which might be invoked as justification for colonialism."

On the 7th, Argentina and Guatemala supported Venezuela's contention on the colonial issue. Guatemala presented a resolution which declared that colonialism retains the people subject to it in a "condition of spiritual and economic subordination," and asserted that it is a "just aspiration of the American republics" to seek termination of colonial status in the Western Hemisphere. Supporting this resolution, the Argentine delegate argued that because of "so friendly" Great Britain's "great struggle for right and justice" throughout the war years, he was certain that Great Britain would acknowledge Argentina's rightful claims to the Malvinas (Falkland Islands).

Guatemala, on the following day (8th), condemned Great Britain and demanded the return of Belize, now part of British Honduras, asserting that: "the map of Guatemala contains the bloody stain of a territorial mutilation--a fifteenth part of its territory snatched away by one of the most powerful empires in the world. ... We do not wish for lands belonging to somebody else; it is enough for us to recover our own. We maintain our will for collaboration with all nations, but we believe that, cardinally, America ought to be united and free of all nations to fulfill its destiny."

The Argentine delegate on April 9 introduced, at a subcommittee meeting, a resolution strengthening Guatemala's stand. The Argentine delegate asked that "colonization or de facto occupation be ended," and that "the legal titles that the American republics possess give rights, responsibilities, and titles against the foreign-occupying nations of this continent." Uruguay, on the other hand, stated that it would not support Argentina and Guatemala, and urged arbitration.

Debate on this subject was resumed in the steering committee on the 21st. Secretary of State Marshall informed the delegates that the United States was opposed to action on the colonial issue by this conference, and would refrain from supporting "any resolution which would appear to pre-judge the conflicting claims of friendly nations." He contended that fairness demanded that other interested parties should get a hearing, but the procedure of the committee made this impossible. Nevertheless, the matter was referred, on a motion by Argentina, to a working committee, which was to draft a resolution acceptable to the conferees.

The following day (22nd) the working committee drafted a nine-point declaration, opposing European occupation of territories in the Western Hemisphere, and recommending the establishment of an inter-American commission for "occupied territories," to investigate the question and report to the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council of the American republics.

The steering committee discussed the working groups' recommendations on the 23rd, and accepted an Ecuadorean proposal that a commission for dependent territories meet in Havana to study pacific ways of resolving the colonial problem. This suggestion was approved by a vote of 17 nations, with the United States, Brazil, Chile, and the Dominican Republic abstaining. The declaration, condemning colonization by foreign powers in the Western Hemisphere, was also accepted by a vote of 18 nations with the United States, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic abstaining.

On April 23 the British Ambassador to Colombia delivered a resolution from the Belize (British Honduras) Legislative Council to the conference, expressing "grave objection to discussions at the conference, at which we are not in any way represented, of matters affecting our vital interests, including our position as a member of the British Commonwealth."

2. Western European Union

Creation of Permanent Consultative Council

Meanwhile, at a meeting in Paris on April 17, the foreign ministers of the five powers adhering to the Brussels treaty agreed on the creation of a "permanent consultative council ... composed of the five foreign ministers." It was arranged that the council would meet "in each of the capitals of the signatory states in turn whenever such a meeting [was] deemed necessary and in any case at least once every three months." A permanent organization of the council was to be established in London, composed of the diplomatic representatives of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and a British appointee. Provision was also made for monthly meetings in London of the defense ministers of the five nations and for the creation of a permanent military committee.

The first meeting of the Ambassadors' committee took place in London on April 24, and a communiqué issued following the meeting stated that the five members would meet "once a week or more frequently if found necessary."

Question of American Support

Belgian Premier Spaak declared in Washington on April 9 that the signatories to the Brussels Pact considered President Truman's message to Congress of March 17 at least a "moral guarantee" of support. Upon his return to Brussels on the 19th, he said he had "found that the situation in Europe [was] very well understood."

Secretary of Defense Forrestal told the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on April 12 that:

"It is my belief that if we make it plain and clear that the United States will not tolerate the destruction of the Western civilization of Europe we shall have peace. Not a peace, I believe, through long and exhausting war that will waste our manpower and our resources—but peace because, for once in world history, an aggressor will be forewarned of our determination backed by strength. It is equally clear to me that if we do not so act, we shall risk a war under circumstances which may be disastrous for us and for our friends throughout the world. ..."

On April 28, U. S. Secretary of State Marshall said that among the many questions under discussion in connection with the Brussels Treaty, the Department of State was considering the extension of some form of lend-lease to the five nations that had signed the pact. In London, "responsible government sources" said that the United States had asked the five parties to the Brussels Treaty to state their military plans and requirements as a basis for conversations on American support.

C. OTHER ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY SECURITY

1. National Military Establishment

Consideration by the Congress of President Truman's recommendation on March 17 for the enactment of universal training and selective service legislation and on April 1 for additional appropriations of \$3 billion for national defense were closely linked together throughout the month of April. Therefore, they are treated together as one item--measures to strengthen the military establishment--in this section, especially since Congressional proposals for an expansion in the Air Force from 55 to 70 groups were viewed in some quarters as a possible offset for any necessity to enact legislation covering compulsory military service.

Measures to Strengthen U.S. Military Establishment

On the 2nd, Defense Secretary Forrestal transmitted to the Armed Services Committee of the House and Senate a draft of suggested legislation for UMT and immediate registration for selective service of males from 18 to 45 years of age. This proposal was limited by the provision that only non-veterans from 19 to 25 would be inducted, except in an emergency. The Administration bill, as presented by the Defense Secretary, recommended substantial increases in the personnel of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force.

Speaking concerning the controversy over the size of the Air Force, Forrestal, on the 3rd, told the Senate Committee that a recent estimate by him that an increase in the present 55 group Air Force by 15 additional would cost from \$15 billion to \$18 billion was "not too high." He indicated that he "did not wish to foreclose the possibility" that at a later time he might request "the full '70 group program' with its essential commitments." Forrestal explained, however, that an addition of 15 groups to the Air Force would complicate a realignment of the balanced power of all the armed services, which might double the present budget by 1953.

Twenty-one bills and resolutions--carrying out the recommendations of the Joint Congressional Air Policy Board for expansion of the Air Force and increasing the strength of civil aviation--were introduced in the Senate on the 6th.

Air Force Secretary Symington and his chiefs of staff appeared before a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the following day. The Air Secretary urged expansion of the Air Force to 70 full groups, at an estimated additional cost of \$2.388 billion in the next fiscal year. The House Armed Services Committee (April 7) adopted unanimously a subcommittee recommendation that the Air Force be increased to at least 70 groups, although it was said that the action was "a gesture."

Forrestal, who had appeared before a closed House Appropriations Committee meeting on the 8th in behalf of additional funds for the Air Force, released a memorandum, endorsed by President Truman, wherein the Secretary declared:

"Building up of one service without commensurate augmentation of its supporting services can be as dangerous as the neglect of such a

service. National security demands balance of forces. Careful study must be devoted to the point at which the impact of additional military procurement, whether for Army, Air Force or Navy, added to the demands made upon an already practically fully employed and tight economy, may produce explosive inflationary consequences. Dollars alone do not guarantee delivery of military end products. Military demands must be within the limits of capacity to produce, or, alternatively, we must accept those controls that are found necessary to channel required manpower and material to insure the desired production."

The Armed Services Committee of the Senate decided on the 9th to wait for air-power recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff before reaching decisions on UMT, selective service, and the proposed increase of the Air Force. The House Committee, however, opened hearings on the 12th on selective service and the size of the Air Force. On that day, the Defense Secretary summarized for the Committee the military program proposed by the Administration.

The House of Representatives on the 15th, with only three dissenting votes, passed a measure increasing the Administration's aircraft contractual authorization to 70 groups, at a cost of \$3.198 billion. The funds requested by President Truman, totalling \$2.376 billion--including transfers from the 1949 budget to the current budget and an additional \$725 million--were voted, and, in addition, \$822 million on amendment for the specific purpose of commencing the expansion of the Air Force.

On the 20th, a revised Selective Service bill, designed to increase the strength of the armed forces to 2,006 million officers and men, was introduced in the House and immediately referred to committee.

A week later (27th), the Senate Armed Service Committee, having been advised of the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the defense budget, began to draft legislation to combine the separate programs for UMT and Selective Service. Under the Senate plan, stop-gap Selective Service would be consolidated with a UMT training program, with men 18 to 19 and one-half years of age being inducted for one year of training as future reserves. President Truman met with the Secretaries of Defense and Army and with the Chief of Staff of the Army on the next day (28th) to consider the merger.

The Senate Committee on the 29th, by a vote of 16 to 1, approved funds for immediate action on an \$822 million program for the procurement of aircraft--the 70 combat groups that had been under consideration all during the month. This sum was part of a \$3.233 billion defense measure adopted by the Committee. As April closed the House Armed Services Committee was continuing work on a separate Selective Service bill.

APPENDIX

LIST OF SELECTED DOCUMENTS

The documents listed in this Appendix are the more important ones issued during April bearing primarily on the developments recorded in this Summary. The list, which generally follows the arrangements of headings in the Summary, has been largely restricted to materials of an official nature, and limitations of space have made it necessary to choose only a very few of the principal items. For additional reference purposes, full texts or excerpts can usually be found in various newspapers or periodicals.

GENERAL

International Transactions of the United States During the War, 1940-45. U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Series No. 65, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1948, 227 pp.

Soviet Supply Protocols. Department of State Publication 2759, European Series 22, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 156 pp.

Memorandum to the President from the Council of Economic Advisers, (April 9, 1948). White House Press Release April 9, 1948, 6 pp. mimeo.

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENTS

Report on Germany by Subcommittee on Germany of House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, February 28, 1948 (released April 8, 1948). U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948 (Note: Recommendations contained in this report were published separately as "Preliminary Report Thirteen" on February 6, 1948). 38 pp.

Japanese Resources and United States Policy by Edward Ackerman. (Printed for use of House Committee on Foreign Affairs), April 1948, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C., 1948, 20 pp.

United States Note to Soviet Government Proposing Consideration of Return of Trieste to Italy (April 9, 1948). Department of State Bulletin Vol. XVIII, No. 459, April 18, 1948, p. 522.

United States Note to Soviet Government on Return of Trieste to Italy (April 16, 1948). Department of State Press Release No. 300, April 16, 1948.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Public Law 472--80th Congress, Chapter 169--2nd Session (S.2202), Approved April 3, 1948, 26 pp.

Text of Convention Setting up Permanent European Aid Organization, New York Times, April 16, 1948.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents. E/Conf.2/78, United Nations Publications, Sales No. 1948.II.D.4. 76 pp.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Protocols and Declaration (signed at Havana March 24). United Nations Publications, Sales No. 1948.II.D.5.

"A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe," (prepared by the Research and Planning Division of the Economic Commission for Europe); Appendix A "The Economic Plans of European Countries." Economic and Social Council Documentation E/ECE/58, March 30, 1948, 169 pp. mimeo. and Appendix 139 pp. mimeo.

House Select Committee on Foreign Aid (Herter Committee): The Role of Steel in the European Recovery Program (Supplement to Preliminary Report Six), April 21, 1948, 33 pp.; The Place of the United States in European Industrial Development (Supplement to Preliminary Report Fourteen), April 22, 1948, 8 pp.; The Belgian-Luxembourg-Netherlands Customs and Economic Union (Preliminary Report Twenty-Four--Subcommittee on France and the Low Countries, April 7, 1948, 10 pp. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1948.

Second Report to Congress on the United States Foreign Relief Program. Department of State Publication 3101, Economic Co-operation Series 5, Released April 1948, 62 pp.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The Soviet Union in 1947, Supplement to Preliminary Report Twenty of the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1948, 15 pp.

President Truman's Message to Senate Transmitting for Ratification Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Italy. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 460, (April 14, 1948), p. 550.

Discussion in the Security Council of the Czechoslovak Question, Statement by U. S. Representative Warren R. Austin (April 6, 1948). Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 459, p. 517.

Discussion in the Security Council of the Czechoslovak Question, Statement by U. S. Representative Warren R. Austin (April 12, 1948). Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 460, pp. 536-539.

Text of Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Finnish Republic (April 6, 1948); Stalin's Speech (April 7, 1948); Molotov's Statement (April 6, 1948), U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin, April 14, 1948, Embassy of U.S.S.R., Washington, D. C., pp. 200-201.

Resolution on the India-Pakistan Question Submitted Jointly by the Representatives of Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, Adopted at the Two Hundred and Eighty-Sixth Meeting of the Security Council (April 21, 1948). United Nations Document S/726, April 22, 1948, 5 pp. mimeo.

Memoranda on Acts of Arab Aggression, Submitted to the United Nations Palestine Commission by the Jewish Agency for Palestine. United Nations Document S/710, April 5, 1948, 21 pp., and United Nations Document S/721, April 15, 1948, 28 pp.

United Nations Palestine Commission Report to the General Assembly. Official Records of the second special session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 1. United Nations Document A/532, April 10, 1948, 39 pp.

The Food Situation in Palestine: United Nations Palestine Commission--Second Special Report to the Security Council. United Nations Document S/720, April 14, 1948, 8 pp. mimeo.

Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine. United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 436, April 19, 1948, 26 pp. mimeo.

Statement on Palestine in General Assembly Committee I by Ambassador Warren R. Austin (April 20, 1948). United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 437, April 20, 1948, 6 pp. mimeo.

Statute for the City of Jerusalem; Draft Prepared by the Trusteeship Council United Nations Document T/118/Rev. 2, April 21, 1948, 21 pp. mimeo.

SECURITY PROBLEMS

Address by the U. S. Secretary of State before the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia (April 1, 1948). Department of State Publication 3139, International Organization and Conference II American Republics, Released April 1948, 14 pp.

Statement of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal before the House Armed Services Committee (April 12, 1948). National Military Establishment Press Release, 19 pp. mimeo.

Statement of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal before the Senate Armed Services Committee (April 21, 1948). National Military Establishment Press Release, 5 pp. mimeo.

Concurrent Resolution, providing for United Nations Charter revision, Senate Concurrent Resolution 50, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, April 12 (legislative day March 29), 1948, 7 pp.

A Bill to promote the common defense by providing for the retention and maintenance of a national reserve of industrial productive capacity, S.2554, Senate of the United States, April 26, 1948, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 pp.

A Bill to provide for the common defense by increasing the strength of the armed forces of the United States, H. R. 6274, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 46 pp.